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Abstract
Many developing countries are populated by multiple ethnic groups who use their own language
in daily life and in local business, but have to use a common language in national business and
in communications with other groups. In these countries, how much weights should be placed on
teaching a local ethnic language and teaching a common language is a critical issue. A similar
conict arises in low-income countries in general between teaching skills that are "practical" and
directly useful in local jobs, and teaching academic skills that are important in modern sector jobs.
This paper develops a model to examine these questions theoretically. It is shown that balanced
education of the two languages/skills is critical for skill development of those with limited wealth
for education. It is also found that the balanced education brings higher earnings net of educational
expenditure, only when a country has favorable conditions (TFP is reasonably high, and education,
in particular, common language education [academic education] is reasonably e¤ective) and only
for those with adequate wealth. Common-language-only (academic-only) education maximizes net
earnings of those with little wealth, and, when the countrys conditions are not good, maximizes
net earnings of all. This implies that there exists a trade-o¤ between educational and economic
outcomes for those with little wealth, and, when the conditions are not good, the trade-o¤ exists for
everyone without adequate wealth. Policy implications derived from the results too are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Many developing countries, particularly of sub-Saharan Africa, are populated by multiple ethnic
groups who use their own language in daily life and in local business, but have to use a common
language (typically, the language of the former colonizer) in national business and in communi-
cations with other groups. In these countries, how much weights should be placed on teaching a
local ethnic language and teaching a common language and which language should be used as a
language of instruction of other subjects are critical issues. Acquiring skills to use a local language
is less demanding, because the language is a mother tongue and a part of the skills are taught at
home, but their uses are limited to a local or ethnic community. By contrast, acquiring skills to
use a common language is harder, but the skills are very important in many modern sector jobs.
A similar conict arises in low-income countries in general, including monolingual countries,
between teaching skills that are "practical" and directly useful in local jobs (e.g., farming and
related skills in an agrarian community) and teaching academic skills that are not "practical" but
are important in jobs involving modern business practice and technology. Acquiring the former
skills is less di¢ cult to many students, because they are more familiar and a part of the skills are
taught at home, but they are not useful in modern sector jobs.
Students and parents have little choice between local language education and common language
education (between "practical" vocational education and academic education) in basic education
(primary and lower secondary level), because weights on the two types of education are mostly
determined by the government.1 As for the language policy in sub-Saharan Africa, former French
colonies had maintained French-only education and former British colonies had conducted mother
tongue education partially, although recently Francophone countries began using local languages
in education and many Anglophone countries reduced the weight on local language education
(Albaugh, 2007; Heugh, 2011a). Many sub-Saharan African countries, where most students do
not proceed to post-basic education, o¤er vocational subjects, such as agriculture, business, and
manual training, in basic education (Atchoarena and Delluc, 2001).
A general consensus among specialists on language and education is that using a local ethnic
language as a language of teaching and learning at least in primary education is e¤ective for
students to acquire adequate language and non-language skills, and the present language policy in
sub-Saharan Africa is overly biased towards common language education, even taking into account
the higher publication cost of local language materials (Heugh, 2011b).2
By contrast, we know very little what is a desirable combination of the two types of education in
terms of future earnings and what kind of educational and economic policies should be conducted
1The paper is not concerned with weights on vocational education and academic education in post-basic education,
in which students can choose from schools or specialities with di¤erent weights.
2Works by Vawda and Patrinos (1999) and others nd that the publication of local language materials is more
costly than that of common language materials, especially when the size of publication is small, in several developing
countries. However, Heugh (2011b) argues that local language education at least in primary schooling is more
e¤ective than education less reliant on a local language, because other costs depend little on the language of teaching
and learning and benets of local language education on educational outcomes are high.
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when both educational and economic outcomes of students are taken into account. These questions
are important because generally what concerns students and their parents most is future earnings.
Despite the recommendation for the increased weight on local language education for skill devel-
opment by experts, many parents in sub-Saharan Africa are resistant to ethnic language education
because they believe that it does not help their children get a job (Albaugh, 2007). Indeed, the
economic return to a common language in multilingual countries can be large. For example, Azam,
Chin, Prakash (2013) nd that the return to speak uent English, a common language in India,
is as large as the return to secondary education and half as large as the return to undergraduate
education, after controlling for age, social group, geography, and proxies for ability.
There also seems to be little agreement on desirable weights on vocational contents and academic
contents in basic education in poor countries. While the role of academic education for modern
sector development cannot be overemphasized, countries such as Ghana increased the weight on
vocational contents after a major education reform (Little, 2010). Brock-Utne and Alidou (2011)
argue that "practical" education is conductive to the socio-cultural and economic development of
studentscommunities, drawing on episodes from sub-Saharan African countries.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model and examine the above-mentioned
important questions theoretically.
Model: In the model, two kinds of "jobs", called national jobs and local jobs, requiring di¤erent
types of skills exist and the nal good is produced from them. In the real economy, national jobs
correspond to many jobs in the modern sector (government and a part of the private sector using
modern technology), while local jobs correspond to many jobs in the traditional sector (traditional
agriculture, urban informal sector, and household sector).
Each person can expend on education to develop skills required in national jobs and skills
required in local jobs. Skills for national jobs correspond to skills to operate a common language
and skills for local jobs correspond to skills to operate a local ethnic language in a multilingual
country.3 An alternative interpretation, which would apply to low-income countries in general, is
that the former skills are academic skills important in jobs involving modern business practice and
technology, while the latter skills are vocational skills directly useful in local jobs.
She can choose the amount of educational spending, but cannot choose its allocation over the
development of the two types of skills, which is xed reecting the fact that weights on the two
types of education are mostly determined by the government. The level of skills for local jobs is
positive without education (i.e. a portion of mother tongue skills and "practical" skills are taught
by family members), while the level of skills for national jobs is zero without education.4
Although the model without credit constraints too is analyzed, the default setting is that
individuals must self-nance education and thus some of them cannot make optimal investment,
3Tasks of typical jobs in the modern sector involve communications with people from other parts of the country
and thus, in a multiethnic country, with other groups, while tasks of typical jobs in the traditional sector involve
communications with mostly locals and thus, in a multiethnic country, with own group.
4Further, when the two types of education are interpreted as common language education and local language
education, the former is assumed to be less e¤ective in skill development based on empirical ndings (footnote 2).
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which reects the fact that, in many developing countries, credit constraints are severe and students
must pay for study materials, commuting cost, and others even when public schools do not charge
tuitions. After expending on education, each person chooses a job and receives earnings. Because
of the assumption that the level of skills for local jobs is positive without education, those with
limited wealth choose a local job and those with abundant wealth choose a national job.
Results and policy implications: The paper examines how a change in weights on the
two types of education a¤ects educational and job choices and earnings. Main results can be
summarized as follows.
First, it is shown that balanced education of skills for national jobs and skills for local jobs
is critical for skill development of those with limited wealth: when the allocation of educational
spending to the two types of education is very biased, the return to educational investment for
local jobs becomes negative, and those who have limited wealth and thus choose a local job do not
spend on education.5 This is consistent with the above-mentioned consensus among experts that
using a local ethnic language at least in primary education is e¤ective for skill development.
Second, it is found that balanced education of the two types of skills brings higher earnings
net of educational expenditure, only when a country has favorable conditions (TFP [total factor
productivity] is reasonably high, and education, in particular, the education of skills for national
jobs, is reasonably e¤ective) and only for those with su¢ cient wealth. Allocating educational
spending completely to the development of skills for national jobs (i.e. skills to operate a common
language or general academic skills) maximizes net earnings of those with little wealth, and, when
the countrys conditions are not good, maximizes net earnings of all. This implies that there
always exists a trade-o¤ between educational and economic outcomes for those with little wealth,
and when the conditions are not good, the trade-o¤ exists for all individuals choosing a local job:
under the biased education, their net earnings are highest but their academic performance is lowest.
Hence, improved academic performance of students after expansion of the education of skills for
local jobs is not necessarily a proof that the greater emphasis on the education is desirable.6
These results have several policy implications. When the countrys conditions are favorable, in
order to bring good educational and economic outcomes to all, the government should implement
the dual education of an appropriate balance together with redistributive policies enabling those
with little wealth expend (su¢ ciently) more on education, such as income transfers and tuition
subsidy.7 Without the latter policies, the very poor lose economically from the implementation of
5One might consider the result that the very poor do not spend on education when the allocation of spending
is very biased not plausible, since the great majority of students take some education even in poor countries. The
di¤erence arises because, for analytical tractability, the model abstracts from motives for attending school other
than the investment motive, including consumption motives (joys of studying or attending school) and social motives
(pleasure of doing what friends do, pressure from family members or the community to attend school).
6 It is also found that allocating educational spending completely to the development of skills for national jobs
is denitely better than introducing education of skills for local jobs on a small scale : the latter does not improve
academic performance of students from poor families and lowers net earnings of all individuals.
7Of course, given weights on the two types of education, redistribution toward those without enough wealth
for educational investment is desirable in the credit constrained economy, as long as their return to education is
positive. Rather, what the statement in the main text asserts is that redistribution toward the very poor is needed
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the dual education, because they cannot spend su¢ ciently enough on education to benet from it.
By contrast, when the conditions are not good, the government should implement not only the
dual education with the redistribution but also policies raising the productivity of the economy or
the e¤ectiveness of education, in particular, that of skills for national jobs. Only when the latter
policies are conducted on a su¢ cient scale, net earnings become higher under the dual education
than under common-language-only (academic-only) education.8
Finally, the result that the redistributive policies are essential for the very poor to benet
economically from the dual education gives another justication for governmental support of basic
education, in addition to usual rationales based on positive externality, human rights, and among
others, in multilingual countries and in low-income countries with large traditional sectors.
Related literature: To the authors knowledge, this paper is the rst attempt to examine
theoretically how weights on two types of education, common language education and local language
education, or academic education and "practical" education in basic education, a¤ect educational
investment and net earnings of individuals with di¤erent family income. There do exist works
examining the issue empirically and works analyzing related issues theoretically.
As mentioned above, researchers in education and linguistics examine the e¤ect of education
language policy on academic achievement of students. In economics, there exist a small number of
empirical works examining e¤ects on educational and labor market outcomes. Angrist, Chin and
Goody (2008) analyze the e¤ect of the policy change in Puerto Rico in 1949, in which Spanish
replaced English as the medium of instruction in secondary education, on English skills, and nd
that the policy change did not lower English skills of the a¤ected students. Laitin, Ramachandran
and Walter (2016) examine the e¤ect of an experimental local language schooling program on
academic performance of students in Cameroon, and nd that e¤ects are sizeable in the short run
but fade quickly after students revert to English-medium education. As for labor market outcomes,
Angrist and Lavy (1999) nd that replacing French with Arabic as the medium of instruction in
post-primary education greatly lowered returns to schooling in Morocco. Cappellari and Di Paolo
(2015) analyze the e¤ects of the 1983 bilingual education reform in the Catalonia region of Spain,
which introduced Catalan alongside Spanish as mediums of instruction, and nd positive wage
returns to the bilingual education but no e¤ects on employment, hours of work, and occupation.9
Pool (1991) develops a model of a multilingual society without intra-group heterogeneity, in
which individual earnings do not depend on choice of o¢ cial language(s), adopting an o¢ cial
language is costly for those whose native language is not o¢ cial, and when there are multiple
o¢ cial languages, translation among the languages is costly and nanced by tax. He shows that
there exists e¢ cient and fair choice of o¢ cial language(s), if appropriate inter-group redistribution is
to implement the dual education, i.e. to choose intermediate weights.
8 If the government cannot implement these policies on a su¢ cient scale for budgetary or other reasons, the dual
education with a smaller weight on education of skills for local jobs than under when the policies can be conducted
might be acceptable: it achieves the higher academic performance of students from relatively poor families than
common-language-only (academic-only) education at the relatively small cost of net earnings.
9There also exist works examining e¤ects of bilingual education in the U.S., which is monolingual rather than
multilingual in business, such as Chin, Daysal, and Imberman (2013) and Lleras-Muney and Shertzer (2015).
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conducted. Ginsburgh, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2005) calculate optimal sets of o¢ cial languages
of the EU that minimize the weighted sum of an index of disenfranchisement (the denial of full
access to o¢ cial documents and political process to those whose native languages are not o¢ cial)
and the cost of maintaining o¢ cial languages. Ortega and Tangerås (2008) develop a model of a
society of two language groups without intra-group heterogeneity, in which the politically dominant
group determine the type(s) of schools (monolingual school in either language and bilingual school)
accessible to each group, individuals decide whether to attend school, and goods are produced from
bilateral matching only when pairs speak the same language. They show that the dominant group
either choose laissez-faire or restrict access to schools using the language of the dominated, while
the dominated prefer schools using their own language.10
Main di¤erences between these works and the present work are the following. In the preceding
works, language groups are heterogenous, o¢ cial or education language(s) are chosen from native
languages, and individuals within each group are homogenous (except Ginsburgh, Ortuño-Ortín,
and Weber (2005), which do not model individual decision-making). By contrast, in the present
work, groups are homogenous, common language is not a native language of any group, and indi-
viduals are heterogenous with respect to wealth available for education. The present work adopts
di¤erent settings, because it focuses on developing countries where common language is typically a
language of the former colonizer and family wealth is a critical determinant of educational invest-
ment, whereas the existing works mainly focus on developed countries.
There also exist theoretical works and case studies examining political aspects of the choice
of education languages in multilingual societies. Laitin (1992) describes the choice of common
languages in various social domains as a bargaining game among players with di¤erent preferences
for candidate languages (nationalist leaders, bureaucrats, education specialists, local leaders, par-
ents, among others), and, based on the model and case studies, argues that a stable outcome is
multilingual  the colonial language is dominant in administrative, business, educational, and tech-
nical domains, and native languages in other domains   in most African countries. Based on case
studies of West African countries, Albaugh (2007) argues that the increased use of local languages
in education in recent years is largely the consequence of long-held pressures from an alliance of
native linguists and NGOs and the changed attitude of the former colonizer, France.
A small number of studies examine empirically the cost e¤ectiveness or economic returns of
vocational education relative to academic education in developing countries, although almost all
studies focus on post-basic education in which students can choose from schools or specialities with
di¤erent weights on the two types of education (see Eichhorst et al. (2015) and Tan and Nam (2012)
10Other works studying issues related to language in economics include the following. Lazear (1999) analyzes a
model of adoption of non-native language skills in a multilingual society and empirically examines its implications.
Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) examine e¤ects of the introduction of a bilingual education system in Catalonia
on Catalan identity and the propensity to vote for a Catalanist party. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012)
empirically examine how measures of linguistic diversity at various levels of linguistic aggregation are associated with
civil conict, growth, public goods provision, and redistribution. Galor, Özak, and Sarid (2018) explore the hypothesis
that geographical characteristics of ancestral homelands that were conductive to certain cultural characteristics lead
to certain language structures.
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for a review). The evidence does not provide a clear picture on the relative e¤ectiveness of the two
types of education, which may be partly due to di¤erences in contents of vocational education, such
as weights on vocational and academic subjects in vocational schools or tracks, across countries.
Based on a theoretical model focusing on tuition-free secondary education of developed countries,
Brunello and Giannini (2004) examine the relative e¢ ciency of the stratied system in which
students are allocated to academic-only or vocational-only education based on academic ability
and the comprehensive system in which all students receive both types of education, and show
numerically that neither system unambiguously dominates the other system.
Organization of the paper: Section 2 presents the model and examines educational and job
choices of individuals. Section 3 provides preliminary analysis of how a change in weights on the
two types of education a¤ects a job choice and earnings of workers, and Section 4, based on results
of the previous sections, presents main results of the paper and discusses their policy implications.
Section 5 concludes. Appendix A presents some auxiliary results, and Appendix B contains proofs
of lemmas and propositions.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a developing economy in which two kinds of "jobs", called national jobs and local jobs,
requiring di¤erent types of skills exist. In the real economy, national jobs correspond to many
jobs in the modern sector (government and a part of the private sector using modern technology),
whose tasks involve communications with people from other parts of the country and thus, in a
multiethnic country, with other groups. Local jobs correspond to many jobs in the traditional
sector (traditional agriculture, urban informal sector, and household sector), whose tasks involve
communications with mostly locals and thus, in a multiethnic country, with own group.11 ;12
The nal good is produced from both types of jobs according to the following technology:
Y = A(Hn)
(Hl)
1 ;  2 (0; 1); (1)
where Hn (Hl) is the aggregate human capital of workers in national (local) jobs and A is constant
total factor productivity (TFP). The production function implies that the two types of jobs are
essential and complementary in the nal good production.
Markets are perfectly competitive. From the prot maximization problem of the nal good
producer, the wage rate per human capital of each type of jobs is given by
wl = (1  )A

Hn
Hl

; wn = A

Hl
Hn
1 
: (2)
11Of course, local (national) jobs also include modern (traditional) sector jobs with such task characteristics.
12The urban informal sector is a part of the urban economy composed of small-scale businesses supplying basic
services (e.g., small shops and vendors selling commodities and meals) and basic manufacturing goods. Even today,
sectors or production activities using traditional technology is important in most developing nations (OECD, 2009).
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Each person can expend on education to develop skills required in national jobs and skills
required in local jobs. Skills required in national jobs correspond to skills to operate a common
language (typically, the language of the former colonizer) and skills for local jobs correspond to skills
to operate a local ethnic language in a multilingual country.13 An alternative interpretation, which
would apply to low-income countries in general, is that the former skills are academic skills that
are not "practical" but are important in jobs involving modern business practice and technology,
while the latter skills are "practical" vocational skills directly useful in local jobs, e.g., farming and
related skills in an agrarian community.
She can choose the amount of total educational spending e, which largely depends on years of
schooling in the real economy, but cannot choose its allocation over the development of the two
types of skills, which is xed reecting the fact that weights on two types of education (common
language education and local language education in a multilingual country, and academic contents
and vocational contents in a low-income country) are mostly determined by the government in
basic education (primary and lower secondary education).14
The human capital production functions of the two types of skills are:
hl(e; sl) = hl +
sle
p
; (3)
hn(e; sl) = 
(1  sl)e
p
; (4)
where sl 2 [0; 1]; hl; p;  > 0; and e  e:
In the above equations, hl is the level of skills for local jobs when e = 0, sl 2 [0; 1] is the proportion
of e allocated to the development of skills for local jobs, p is the unit cost of education in terms
of the nal good (or the reciprocal of productivity of the education of skills for local jobs), and
 is the e¤ectiveness of the education of skills for national jobs relative to that of skills for local
jobs. The level of skills for local jobs is positive without education reecting the fact that they
can be developed partly at home (a portion of mother tongue skills and "practical" skills are
taught by family members), while the level of skills for national jobs is zero without education.
When the two types of education correspond to common language education and local language
education,  < 1 would be reasonable considering the higher cost e¤ectiveness of the latter in skill
development (Heugh, 2011b; see footnote 2). The production functions are assumed to be linear
to make the model analytically tractable. Because the marginal return to educational investment
does not depend on e, i.e. wnhn(1; sl)   1 = wn 1 slp   1 for national jobs and wl slp   1 for local
jobs, the upper limit e is set so that realized e does not become too large for some individuals.15
13Under this interpretation, the model implicitly assumes that workers of di¤erent ethnolinguistic groups with a
given type of jobs are perfectly substitutable in production or ethnolinguistic groups are symmetric in every respect.
14Many sub-Saharan African countries, where most students do not proceed to post-basic education, o¤er "prac-
tical" vocational subjects, such as agriculture, business, and manual training, in basic education (Atchoarena and
Delluc, 2001). Note that the paper is not concerned with weights on vocational education and academic education
in post-basic education, in which students can choose from schools or specialities with di¤erent weights.
15 In particular, the upper limit e is needed for demand for e to be bounded when individuals do not face credit
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Although the model without credit constraints on educational investment too is analyzed, the
default setting is that individuals must self-nance education and thus some of them cannot make
optimal investment. This reects the fact that, in many developing countries, credit constraints
on the investment are severe and students must pay for study materials, commuting cost, and
supplementary education even when public schools do not charge tuitions.16 Thus, a person who
has wealth (endowment) a available for educational spending can spend at most e = a on education.
Let F (a) be the distribution function (and f(a) be the probability density function) of wealth over
the population, which is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable.
After deciding on the amount of education, each person chooses a job and receives earnings,
which are spent on the nal good for consumption.17
2.2 Educational and job choices
Now, educational and job choices and the determination of several endogenous variables are exam-
ined in detail.
2.2.1 When education is worthwhile for both types of jobs
First, consider the case in which education is worthwhile, i.e. the return to educational investment
is non-negative, for both types of jobs. In this case, those who have wealth (endowment) a  e
spend e = a on education and those with a > e spend e = e on education. Because both types of
jobs are essential in nal good production and hn(0; sl) = 0 < hl(0; sl) = hl; there exists e
+ 2 (0; e]
satisfying wnhn(e+; sl) = wlhl(e+; sl); and those who spend e < e+ on education choose a local
job, whereas, when e+ < e; those who spend e > e+ choose a national job, and when e+ = e; those
who spend e = e are indi¤erent between the two types of jobs. Intuitively speaking, those who
have limited wealth and thus cannot spend much on education choose a local job, because a part of
skills for such job (hl) does not require educational spending. Figure 1 illustrates how educational
and job choices and earnings depend on wealth a when e+ < e:18
The aggregate human capital of workers in local and national jobs, Hl and Hn; are given by
When e+<e; Hl(e
+; sl)=
R e+
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de and Hn(e
+; sl)=
R e
e+hn(e; sl)f(e)de+[1  F (e)]hn(e; sl),
(5)
When e+=e; Hl(n; sl)=
R e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de+(1 n) [1  F (e)]hl(e; sl) (6)
and Hn(n; sl) = n[1  F (e)]hn(e; sl); (7)
constraints on educational investment. (The return to educational investment for national jobs must be strictly
positive, because wnhn(e; sl) e = [wnhn(1; sl)  1] e  wlhl(0; sl) = wlhl must hold for those taking a national job.)
16Bray and Kwok (2003) briey review existing studies, which show that the use of private supplementary tutoring
is extensive even among primary school students in developing countries.
17Wealth (endowment) net of educational spending, a   e, too is consumed, which is assumed to yield the same
per unit utility as the nal good.
18When e+ = e; wlhl intersects with wnhn at a = e; and those with a  e are indi¤erent between the two types
of jobs.
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Figure 1: Educational and job choices and earnings when education is worthwhile for all jobs and
e+ < e
where n 2 [0; 1] is the proportion of individuals choosing a national job among those with wealth
a  e when e+ = e and is equal to (from wnhn(e; sl) = wlhl(e; sl) and (2))
n = 
(
1 +
R e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de
[1  F (e)]hl(e; sl)
)
: (8)
When e+ < e; e+ is determined by
wnhn(e
+; sl) = wlhl(e
+; sl) (9)
, Hl(e+; sl)hn(e+; sl) = (1  )Hn(e+; sl)hl(e+; sl) (from (2)): (10)
2.2.2 When education is not worthwhile for local jobs
Next, consider the case in which education is not worthwhile (the return to educational investment
is negative) for local jobs. (Education must always be worthwhile for national jobs, because skills
for such jobs cannot be developed without education.) In this case, there exists e+ 2 (0; e] satisfying
wnhn(e
+; sl) e+ = wlhl and those with wealth a < e+ do not spend on education (e = 0) and
choose a local job. When e+ < e; those with a > e+ choose a national job (those with a 2 (e+; e]
spend e = a and those with a > e spend e = e), whereas when e+ = e; those with a  e+ = e are
indi¤erent between the two types of jobs. Figure 2 illustrates how educational and job choices and
earnings net of educational spending depend on wealth a when e+ < e:
In this case, Hl and Hn are given by
When e+<e; Hl(e
+; sl)=F (e
+)hl and Hn(e
+; sl)=
R e
e+hn(e; sl)f(e)de+[1  F (e)]hn(e; sl); (11)
When e+=e; Hl(n; sl)=fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl and Hn(n; sl)=n[1 F (e)]hn(e; sl): (12)
When e+<e, e+ is determined by the following equation with Hl = Hl(e+; sl) and Hn = Hn(e+; sl)
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Figure 2: Educational and job choices and earnings net of educational spending when education is
not worthwhile for local jobs and e+ < e
(equation (11)):
wnhn(e
+; sl) e+ = wlhl(0; sl), [wnhn(1; sl) 1]e+ = wlhl
,
"
A

Hl
Hn
1 

1 sl
p
 1
#
e+=(1 )A

Hn
Hl

hl (from (2)); (13)
while when e+ = e, n is the solution to the above equation with Hl = Hl(n; sl) and Hn =
Hn(n; sl) (equation (12)).
2.2.3 When is education worthwhile for local jobs and when does e+ < e (or e+ = e)
hold?
So far, educational and job choices and the determination of several endogenous variables are
examined with the sign of the return to education for local jobs and the magnitude relation of e+
to e taken as given. The question is when education is (or is not) worthwhile for local jobs, and
when e+ < e (or e+ = e) holds. The next proposition provides the answer.
Proposition 1 Suppose that TFP, A; is not extremely low. Then,
(i) (a) There exist two critical values of sl 2 (0; 1) at which the return to educational investment
for local jobs equals 0, and for sl smaller (greater) than the lower (higher) critical value, the
return is negative and those with wealth a < e+ do not spend on education, while the return is
positive and they spend e = a on education for sl between the critical values.
(b) The lower [higher] critical value of sl decreases [increases] with A (TFP) and  (relative e¤ec-
tiveness of education of skills for national jobs) and increases [decreases] with p (unit cost of
education) and, when e+ < e, F (e):
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(ii) e+ < e holds if F (e) is large or sl is small, and e+ = e holds otherwise.19 When F (e)  1 ;
e+ = e always holds.
The rst part of the proposition shows that, when the proportion of educational spending
allocated to the development of skills for local jobs, sl, is very low or very high, the return to
educational investment for local jobs becomes negative, and those who have limited wealth (a < e+)
and thus choose a local job do not spend on education. When sl is very low, the marginal return
wl
sl
p  1 is negative, because the marginal e¤ect of e on the human capital for local jobs, slp ; is very
small, which dominates high wage rate wl due to large human capital ratio HnHl .
20 When sl is very
high, the return is negative, because wl becomes very low due to small HnHl ; which dominates a large
marginal e¤ect on the human capital. When sl is moderate, the return is positive and those who
choose a local job spend as much as they can on education, i.e. e = a. Higher TFP (total factor
productivity), higher e¤ectiveness of education of skills for national jobs (relative to education of
skills for local jobs), and lower unit cost of education widen the range of sl over which education is
worthwhile for those choosing a local job, because they raise the wage rate or the marginal e¤ect
of educational expenditure on the human capital. The distribution of wealth too a¤ects the sign of
the return when e+ < e: as the proportion of those who cannot a¤ord the highest level of education
e falls, i.e. F (e) falls, the range of sl with the positive return expands because of higher wl (see
Figure 3).
The result that those choosing a local job do not spend on education when sl is very low or very
high might appear implausible, since the great majority of students take some education even in
poor countries. The di¤erence from the real economy arises because, for tractability, the model ab-
stracts from motives for attending school other than the investment motive, including consumption
motives (joys of studying or attending school) and social motives (pleasure of doing what friends
do, pressure from family members or the community to attend school). The result, however, sheds
light on an important source of poor academic performance of students in many developing coun-
tries. According to the result, students from modest backgrounds have weak incentive to study
and thus perform badly, either because what they learn is mostly irrelevant to their future jobs in
the local or ethnic community (when sl is very low) or because their future earnings are low due
to decient skills of workers in complementary modern sector jobs (when sl is very high).
The result shows that balanced education of skills for national jobs and skills for local jobs
(moderate sl) is critical for skill development of those with limited wealth. This is consistent with
a general consensus among specialists on language and education mentioned in Introduction that
using a local ethnic language at least in primary education is e¤ective for students to acquire
adequate skills (Heugh, 2011b).
19Further, when the return is negative, e+ < e is more likely to hold when A and  are high or p is low. When the
return is positive, e+ < e is more likely to hold when p is low (high) if
R e
0
ef(e)de < (>)(1  )e.
20Small sl implies small Hl and large Hn; since hl is low and hn is high and, as shown later, a high proportion of
workers choose a national job.
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Figure 3: Proposition 1
The second part of the proposition states that e+ < e holds, that is, some individuals who
do not have wealth to spend e on education get a national job, if the share of such individuals
F (e) is high or the fraction of resources spent on the development of skills for local jobs sl is low,
otherwise, e+ = e holds; that is, everyone who cannot a¤ord e takes a local job (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 illustrates the proposition on the (sl; F (e)) plane assuming
R e
0 ef(e)de < (1   )e.21
When sl is very low or very high, the return to educational investment for local jobs is negative,
while the return is positive when sl is in the intermediate region. (The lower [higher] critical sl
when e+ = e, which does not depend on F (e), is denoted by sl [sl] in the gure.) When e+ < e;
the intermediate region narrows as F (e) increases. The dividing lines between e+ < e and e+ = e
(bold dashed lines) are upward-sloping, thus, for given sl, e+ < e (e+ = e) holds when F (e) is
relatively high (low).22 Note that e+ = e holds for any sl when F (e)  1   , which is used in
later analysis.
3 Preliminary Analysis
This section provides preliminary analysis of how a change in weights on the two types of education
a¤ects a job choice and earnings. For ease of presentation, the analysis is conducted mostly without
taking into account Proposition 1 (Figure 3), which shows that whether education is worthwhile
21When
R e
0
ef(e)de > (1 )e; as proved in the proof of (ii) of Proposition 1, e+ < e always holds when the return
is positive. When
R e
0
ef(e)de = (1   )e; the dividing line between e+ < e and e+ = e when the return is positive
equals F (e) = 1  : Main results are unchanged in these cases.
22The dividing line when the return is positive is located below the one when the return is negative on the loci for
zero return, which is shown in Claim 1 of Appendix A.
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for local jobs or not and whether e+ < e or e+ = e holds depend on values of sl; F (e), and
other parameters. The next section presents main results of the paper by taking into account the
proposition, based on the result in this section.
3.1 E¤ects on a job choice and wage rates
The next lemma examines the e¤ect of sl on the variables governing a job choice, e+ when e+ < e
and n when e+ = e:
Lemma 1 When e+ < e;
de+
dsl
> 0; and when e+ = e;
dn
dsl
< 0:
When the higher proportion of educational spending is allocated to the development of skills
for local jobs, the higher fraction of individuals choose a local job, i.e. de
+
dsl
> 0 when e+ < e
and dndsl < 0 when e
+ = e: The result can be explained as follows. Remember that a value of
the variable governing a job choice, i.e. e+ when e+ < e and n when e+ = e; is determined by
wnhn(e
+; sl) = wlhl(e
+; sl) when the return to educational investment for local jobs is positive,
and by wnhn(e+; sl) e+ = wlhl when the return is negative. For given e+ or n, an increase in sl
(weakly) raises hl(e+; sl) and lowers hn(e+; sl), which induces some workers to shift from a national
job to a local job, while it raises wn and lowers wl through a positive e¤ect on the aggregate human
capital ratio HlHn ; which induces the shift in the opposite direction. When hl > 0; the former e¤ect
dominates and thus the higher fraction of workers choose a local job.
Based on the above lemma, the next lemma examines the e¤ect of sl on wage rates.
Lemma 2
dwn
dsl
> 0 and
dwl
dsl
< 0:
When the higher proportion of spending is allocated to the development of skills for local jobs,
the wage rate of national jobs rises and that of local jobs falls. This is because the aggregate human
capital ratio HlHn rises due to increased (decreased) human capital of those with a local (national)
job and the shift of some workers from a national job to a local job (Lemma 1).
3.2 E¤ects on earnings
Hence, an increase in sl raises (lowers) the human capital of workers who choose a local (national)
job because of limited (su¢ cient..) wealth, but lowers (raises) their wage rate. Which e¤ect
dominates? The following propositions examine the e¤ect of sl on earnings based on the lemmas.
The rst proposition examines the case in which the return to educational investment for local
jobs is negative.
Proposition 2When sl is small or large enough that the return to educational investment for local
jobs is negative, earnings decrease with sl for all individuals.
When sl is small or large enough that the return to education for local jobs is negative, as stated
in Proposition 1, those who choose a local job due to limited wealth (a < e+) do not spend on
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education. The proposition shows that, under such situation, earnings of all individuals decrease
when the greater proportion of educational expenditure is allocated to the development of skills
for local jobs. Earnings of those who choose a local job decrease because their wage rate wl falls
due to higher HlHn [because of decreased human capital of those with a national job and the shift
of some workers from a national job to a local job] and their human capital remains unchanged at
the lowest level, hl. Earnings of those choosing a national job fall because higher sl lowers their
human capital, which dominates a positive e¤ect on their wage rate wn.
The second case to examine is the case in which the return is positive and e+ = e holds.
The next proposition summarizes the e¤ect of sl on earnings for this case, assuming, for ease of
presentation, that this case exists for any sl.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the return to educational investment for local jobs is positive and
e+ = e holds.
(i)
d(wnhn)
dsl
R 0 for sl S s??l  (1  )  phle :23
(ii) (a) If e  1+1 phl; when e > (phl+e) ;
d(wlhl)
dsl
R 0 for sl S s?l (e); where s?0l (e) > 0 and
s?l (e) < s
??
l for e < e (s
?
l (e) = s
??
l );
24 while when e  (phl+e),
d(wlhl)
dsl
< 0 for any sl > 0.
(b) Otherwise, when e 2

(phl+e)
1+ 1
4phe
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
; (phl+e)

;
d(wlhl)
dsl
is negative for sl < sl (e) 2
(0;s?l (e)), where s
0
l (e) < 0; positive for sl 2 (sl (e); s?l (e)), and negative for sl > s?l (e): The
results when e > (phl+e) and when e  (phl+e)1+ 1
4phe
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
are same as (a).25
Figure 4 (a) illustrates the proposition when e  1+1 phl; and Figure 4 (b) illustrates the
proposition when e > 1+1 phl. As mentioned above, the proposition summarizes the e¤ect of sl on
earnings, assuming, for ease of presentation, that the return is positive and e+ = e holds for any
sl; although this is not true, as shown in Proposition 1. In particular, when sl is very low or very
large, the return is negative. When main results are presented in the next section, the result of
Proposition 1 is taken into account.
In both (a) and (b), earnings of workers with a national job (those with wealth a  e+ = e)
increase with sl for sl < s??l , decrease with sl for sl > s
??
l ; and are maximized at sl = s
??
l . Intuitively
speaking, positive expenditure on the education of skills for local jobs maximizes earnings of workers
with a national job, because both types of jobs are complementary in production. A more precise
explanation is as follows. As mentioned above, an increase in sl lowers their human capital hn(e; sl)
but raises the wage rate wn. When sl is low (high), the latter e¤ect dominates (is dominated by)
the former e¤ect, mainly because the aggregate human capital ratio HlHn is relatively low (high) and
thus the marginal e¤ect of HlHn on the wage rate is large (small) [see (2)].
23s??l  (1  )   phle > 0, e > 1 phl is assumed thereafter.
24s?l (e) (s

l (e) of (b)) is the greater (smaller) solution of  ee(sl)2 + [(1  )e  (1 + )phl] esl +
[  (phl + e) + e] phl = 0:
25When e =  (phl + e),
d(wlhl)
dsl
 (<)0 for positive sl  (>)s?l (e) and d(wlhl)dsl = 0 at sl = 0:
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(a) When e  1+1 phl (b) When e > 1+1 phl
Figure 4: E¤ect of sl on earnings when the return is positive and e+ = e (Proposition 3)
The e¤ect of sl on earnings of workers with a local job (those with a  e+ = e) is di¤erent
depending on the level of e(= a) and in (a) and (b). First, consider case (a) e  1+1 phl: When
the wealth of an individual is high enough that her educational spending satises e > (phl + e) ;
her earnings increase (decrease) with sl for sl < (>)s?l (e) and are maximized at sl = s
?
l (e); where
s?l (e) < s
??
l and s
?0
l (e) > 0: The shape of the graph is similar to that of earnings of workers with
a national job, although sl maximizing earnings of workers with a local job is lower.26 As wealth
and thus educational spending e increases, s?l (e) increases and the graph shifts upward. (When
e = e+ = e; the graph of workers with a local job coincides with that of workers with a national
job.) By contrast, when the wealth of an individual is low enough that e  (phl + e) holds, her
earnings decrease with sl for any sl and thus are maximized at sl = 0.
That is, although higher sl means the higher proportion of expenditure allocated to the edu-
cation of skills for local jobs, no allocation to the education maximizes earnings of workers with
little wealth who choose a local job.
As stated earlier, an increase in sl raises human capital hl(e; sl) but lowers wage rate wl of
workers with a local job. When sl is low (high), the latter e¤ect tends to be dominated by
(dominates) the former e¤ect, mainly because HnHl is relatively high (low) and thus its marginal
e¤ect on the wage rate is small (large). Further, the former positive e¤ect through human capital
increases with e; because an individual with greater wealth and thus educational spending benets
more from the increased weight on the education of skills useful for local jobs. Hence, earnings
26This is not necessarily true when e+ < e; the next case to examine. Numerical simulations show that, when
e+ < e, sl maximizing earnings of workers with a local job can be higher depending on parameters.
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of a worker with a local job increase (decrease) with sl for small (large) sl and optimal sl, s?l (e);
increases with e; when she has relatively large wealth: By contrast, when she has limited wealth
to spend on education, the positive e¤ect through human capital is small and dominated by the
negative e¤ect through the wage rate even at sl = 0, thus the earnings are highest at sl = 0:
In case (b) e > 1+1 phl; the e¤ect of sl on earnings of workers with a local job is similar to
the previous case when wealth (and thus educational spending) is large (i.e. e > (phl + e)) and
when it is very small (i.e. e  (phl+e)
1+ 1
4phe
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
), but, in the intermediate range of wealth,
their earnings now decrease with sl for sl < sl (e) 2 (0; s?l (e)) (s0l (e) < 0); increase with sl for
sl 2 (sl (e); s?l (e)), and decrease with sl for higher sl (see Figure 4 (b)):27
Finally, the case in which the return is positive and e+ < e is examined. The next proposition
summarizes analytical results of this case, based on Proposition A1 in Appendix A, which presents
detailed results. In the proposition, symbol e+(sl) is used to signify the dependence of e+ on sl
(e+0(sl) > 0 from Lemma 1).
Proposition 4 Suppose that the return to educational investment for local jobs is positive and
e+ < e holds.
(i) (a) If the proportion of those with limited wealth is high enough that e+(0)  phl1  holds;
d(wnhn)
dsl
< 0 for any sl:
(b) Otherwise, d(wnhn)dsl > (<) 0 for small (large) sl: sl satisfying
d(wnhn)
dsl
= 0 is smaller than s??l ,
the critical sl when e+ = e:
(ii) (a) If e 1+1 phl; d(wlhl)dsl > (<) 0 for small (large) sl when e is large, while
d(wlhl)
dsl
<0 for any
sl when e is small. sl satisfying
d(wlhl)
dsl
= 0 when e is large is greater than s?l (e), the critical
sl when e+ = e:
(b) Otherwise, d(wlhl)dsl is negative for small sl, positive for middle sl, and negative for large sl
when e is intermediate, while results when e is small and large are similar to (a): sl maximizing
(minimizing) wlhl when e is intermediate is greater (smaller) than s?l (e) (s

l (e)); the critical
sl when e+ = e:
(c) The maximum e such that d(wlhl)dsl < 0 holds for any sl is lower than when e
+ = e:
Unlike the previous cases, analytical results cannot be obtained for some ranges of sl (see
Proposition A1 in Appendix A). The above proposition and numerical simulations, however, suggest
that results for workers with a local job are similar to case e+ = e : when e 1+1 phl; wlhl increases
(decreases) with sl for small (large) sl when e is large, and wlhl decreases with sl for any sl when
e is small (like Figure 4 (a) when e+ = e); when e > 1+1 phl; wlhl decreases with sl for small sl,
increases with sl for middle sl, and decreases with sl for large sl when e is intermediate, while
results when e is large and small are similar to the previous case (like Figure 4 (b)). Figure 5
27Greater e compared to case (a) e  1+
1 phl implies higher
Hn
Hl
for given sl; thus the marginal negative e¤ect
of sl on wl is smaller. Hence, when e  (phl + e) but e is not very small, the earnings increase with sl for
sl 2 (s l (e); s?l (e)); unlike the previous case in which they decrease with sl for any sl:
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(a) When e  1+1 phl (b) When e > 1+1 phl
Figure 5: E¤ect of sl on earnings when the return is positive and e+ < e (Proposition 4)
presents a numerical example of the relationship between sl and earnings of workers with a local
job when e is large, small, and very small (in (b) only), and of workers with a national job.28
There exist minor di¤erences from case e+ = e: First, sl maximizing earnings of workers with
a local job is greater than s?l (e), the critical sl when e
+ = e:29 ;30(Also, sl minimizing the earnings
when e> 1+1 phl and e is intermediate is smaller than s

l (e) when e
+ = e.) Second, the maximum
level of wealth and educational spending such that the earnings decrease with sl for any sl (and
thus sl = 0 maximizes the earnings) is lower than when e+ = e: From Proposition 1 (Figure 3),
for given sl, e+ < (=)e holds when F (e) is relatively large (small). Hence, these results imply
that workers who have limited wealth and thus choose a local job are more likely to benet from
the education of skills for local jobs when the proportion of those who cannot a¤ord e; including
themselves, is high, i.e. e+ < e; than when the share of such individuals is low, i.e. e+ = e.
Results for workers with a national job too are similar to case e+ = e; but there exist some
28 In both (a) and (b),  = 0:5; hl =  = 0:5; the distribution of wealth follows a truncated log normal distribution
with maximum 100, mean 6 and variance 10, and the value of e of the earning prole for national jobs equals e. In
(a), p = 4; e = 6; A = 30; and values of e of the proles for local jobs when e is large and small are respectively
1:1 (phl + e) = 4:4 and 0:4(e) = 1:6, where (e)
(phl+e)
1+ 1
4phe [(1 )e (1+)phl]
2 ; while in (b), p = 1; e = 10; A = 10;
and values of e of the proles when e is large, small, and very small are respectively  (phl + e) = 5:25, 0:87(e) = 2:4,
and 0:1(e) = 0:2759:
29Unlike case e+ = e; an analytical result cannot be obtained regarding the relationship between sl maximizing
wlhl and e. Numerical simulations, however, suggest that the relationship is positive as before.
30However, simulations show that, depending on parameters, it is possible that minimum e such that d(wlhl)
dsl
> 0
for small sl is greater than e+ for any sl (i.e., individuals with such a = e choose a national job), and thus realized
wlhl decreases with sl for any sl. Simulations also suggest that, in such case, wnhn too decreases with sl for any sl.
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di¤erences. First, if the proportion of those with limited wealth is high enough that e+(0)  phl1 
holds, wnhn decreases with sl for any sl:31 Second, when e+(0) >
phl
1  ; sl maximizing wnhn is
smaller than s??l when e
+ = e: Hence, workers who have abundant wealth to choose a national job
are less likely to benet from the education of skills for local jobs when e+ < e:
4 Main Results
Propositions 2 4 in the previous section examine e¤ects of sl on earnings for three di¤erent cases
(the negative return to educational investment for local jobs, the positive return and e+ < e; and
the positive return and e+ = e) separately, by assuming that the economy is in a particular case
for any sl. Proposition 1 (Figure 3) in Section 2.2, however, shows that which of the three cases is
realized depends on sl and other parameters. This section, by taking into account Proposition 1
as well as the results in the previous section, analyzes e¤ects of sl on earnings net of educational
spending. E¤ects on net earnings rather than gross earnings are examined now, because educational
spending of an individual could di¤er depending on which case is realized.
4.1 When F (e)  1  
The next proposition examines e¤ects of sl on net earnings when the share of individuals who
cannot a¤ord the highest level of education e is low enough that F (e)  1  holds, in which case
e+ = e always holds (see Figure 3). (In what follows, sl (sl) is the lower (higher) critical level of sl
at which the return to educational spending for workers with a local job is 0 when e+ = e.)
Proposition 5 Suppose that F (e)  1   and thus e+ = e hold.
(i) If A and  are small or p is large, net earnings of all workers decrease with sl.
(ii) Otherwise,
(a) Net earnings of workers with a national job decrease with sl for sl < sl, increase with sl for
sl 2 (sl; s??l ); and decrease with sl for sl > s??l : The net earnings are maximized at sl = s??l
when A and  are large enough or p is small enough.
(b) Net earnings of those with a local job and wealth above a certain level decrease with sl for
sl < maxfsl; sl (e)g, increase with sl for sl 2 (maxfsl; sl (e)g; s?l (e)), and decrease with sl for
sl > s
?
l (e), while net earnings of those with wealth below the threshold decrease with sl for any
sl:
32 Net earnings of the former workers are maximized at sl = s?l (e); when A and  are large
enough or p is small enough.
(c) The threshold wealth in (b); sl; and maxfsl; sl (e)g decrease with A and  (when maxfsl; sl (e)g =
sl) and increase with p. s??l and s
?
l (e) decrease with p.
31As mentioned in footnote 26, numerical simulations show that, when e+ < e, sl maximizing earnings of workers
with a local job can be higher than sl maximizing earnings of workers with a national job depending on parameters.
Thus, it is possible that wnhn decreases with sl for any sl and sl maximizing wlhl is positive. Simulations also show
that when e+(0) is low enough, both wnhn and realized wlhl (i.e. wlhl with e  e+) decrease with sl for any sl.
32From Proposition 3 (ii), sl (e) does not exist and thus maxfsl; sl (e)g = sl when e  1+1 phl:
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The rst part of the proposition shows that, if A and  are small or p is large, net earnings of all
workers decrease with sl for any sl. This implies that allocating educational spending completely
to the education of skills for national jobs (sl = 0) maximizes net earnings of all workers, if TFP is
low, the e¤ectiveness of the education of skills for national jobs (relative to the education of skills
for local jobs) is low, or the unit cost of education is high.
The result can be explained as follows. When sl is low or high enough that the return to
education for those choosing a local job is negative, i.e. sl < sl or sl > sl, as shown in Proposition
2, net earnings of all workers decrease with sl: This is mainly because the greater emphasis on
education of skills for local jobs does not a¤ect the human capital of those choosing a local job
(unchanged at hl) and lowers the human capital of those choosing a national job, which in turn
lowers the wage rate of complementary local jobs (see the paragraph just after the proposition for
details). When sl is not at extremes and thus the return is positive, as shown in Proposition 3,
net earnings of all workers decrease with sl when sl is high, while net earnings of workers with
wealth above a threshold increase with sl when sl is low. The result when sl is high (low) is true,
roughly because human capital for local (national) jobs is relatively abundant and thus a negative
e¤ect of higher sl on earnings through the decreased human capital for national jobs dominates (is
dominated by) a positive e¤ect through the increased human capital for local jobs (see paragraphs
after the proposition for details).33 When TFP is low or education is not e¤ective or costly, i.e. A
and  are small or p is large, the return to education is low for given sl: Hence, the range of sl for
which the return to education for local jobs is negative expands, i.e. sl increases and sl decreases,
and net earnings decrease with sl for the entire range of sl for which the return is positive.34
By contrast, if A and  are large or p is small, net earnings of workers with wealth above a
certain level, who choose a national job or a local job depending on the level of wealth and sl,
decrease with sl for small sl; increase with sl for intermediate sl; and decrease with sl again for
large sl: This result could be understood from Proposition 2 and Figure 4 (Proposition 3). For
these workers, an intermediate level of sl (s??l for workers with a national job and s
?
l (e) for workers
with a local job and a = e) or sl = 0 maximizes net earnings, and, when A and  are large enough
or p is small enough, allocating the expenditure to both types of education is optimal. Finally,
net earnings of workers with wealth (and thus educational spending) below the threshold decrease
with sl for any sl. Thus, net earnings of those with little wealth are maximized at sl = 0 regardless
of the level of TFP and the e¤ectiveness and the cost of education.
As for the latter case, the last part of the proposition shows that, the wealth threshold falls
and the range of sl over which raising sl increases net earnings of those with wealth above the
threshold expands, as A and  are higher or p is lower. It also shows that, when an intermediate
33When sl is low, net earnings increase with sl only for workers with wealth above a threshold, because benets
from the increased weight on the education of skills for local jobs are small for those who have limited wealth and
thus can spend not much on education.
34According to Proposition 3, when the return is positive, net earnings of workers with wealth above the threshold
are maximized at s??l (s
?
l (e)) for those choosing a national (local) job, and their net earnings decrease with sl for
greater sl. If A and  are small enough or p is large enough, sl > s??l (> s
?
l (e)) holds.
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level of sl maximizes their net earnings, the optimal sl becomes higher as p is lower. These results
imply that higher TFP and more e¤ective or less costly education make the greater proportion of
people gain from the balanced education of two types of skills, and less costly education makes the
greater emphasis on the education of skills for local jobs desirable for these people.
The rst part of the proposition implies that the dual education lowers net earnings of workers
irrespective of their wealth, if TFP is low, the e¤ectiveness of education of skills for national jobs is
low, or the unit cost of education is high. This can be seen clearly by considering the case without
credit constraints on educational investment, in which all individuals have wealth to nance the
highest level of education, i.e. F (e) = 0.
Corollary 1 Suppose that everyone has wealth greater than e; i.e. F (e) = 0.
(i) If A and  are small or p is large, net earnings of all individuals decrease with sl.
(ii) Otherwise, net earnings of all individuals decrease with sl for sl < sl, increase with sl for
sl 2 (sl; s??l ); and decrease with sl for sl > s??l : Their net earnings are maximized at sl = s??l
when A and  are large enough or p is small enough.
Without credit constraints, if A and  are large enough or p is low enough, a balanced allocation
of expenditure to both types of education (sl = s??l ) maximizes net earnings of all workers, but if
not, complete allocation to the education of skills for national jobs remains optimal for all.
4.2 When F (e) > 1  
When the proportion of those who cannot a¤ord e is high enough that F (e) > 1  holds, e+ < e
as well as e+ = e could happen depending on levels of sl and other parameters (see Figure 3).
When e+ = e; Proposition 5 applies. When e+ < e, analytical results on the relation between sl
and net earnings cannot be obtained for some ranges of sl and e (as suggested from Proposition 4
in Section 3 and Proposition A1 in Appendix A). The next proposition, however, shows that main
results of this case are similar to the previous case. In what follows, sl(f) (sl(f)) denotes the lower
(higher) sl such that the return to educational investment for local jobs is 0 when e+ < e: ("f" is
to indicate the dependence of their values on the distribution of wealth.)
Proposition 6 Suppose that e+ < e holds.35
(i) If A and  are small or p is large, net earnings of all individuals decrease with sl except at
sl = sl(f), sl = sl(f), or both, where they increase discontinuously.36 The net earnings are
maximized at sl = 0 if A and  are small enough or p is large enough.
35Unlike when e+ = e (Proposition 5); the proposition does not cover intermediate ranges of A, ; p, and a = e.
36 Net earnings of workers who have abundant wealth and thus choose a national job for any sl, i.e. a 
minfe+(1); eg, decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f); net earnings of workers who have limited wealth and thus
choose a local job for any sl; i.e. a < e+(0), decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f); and net earnings of workers who
choose a national (local) job when sl is small (large) decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f), sl = sl(f), or both.
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(ii) Those with wealth below a certain level choose a local job for any sl and their net earnings
decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f), where they increase discontinuously, and are maximized
at sl = 0.
(iii) If A and  are large or p is small enough, net earnings of those with wealth greater than a
certain level decrease with sl for small sl, increase with sl for middle sl, and decrease with sl
for large sl; and are maximized at sl 2 (sl(f); sl(f)):37
The rst part of the proposition shows that, if A and  are small or p is large, net earnings
of all individuals decrease with sl, except at sl = sl(f), sl = sl(f), or both, where the return is 0
and the net earnings increase discontinuously, which is di¤erent from Proposition 5, but, as before,
the net earnings are maximized at sl = 0 if A and  are small enough or p is large enough.38 The
second part shows that net earnings of individuals with wealth below a certain level decrease with
sl; di¤erently from case e+ = e except at sl = sl(f), where they increase discontinuously, but as
before, their net earnings are maximized at sl = 0. Hence, complete allocation of expenditure to
the education of skills for national jobs remains optimal for those with little wealth, and when TFP
is low, the e¤ectiveness of education of skills for national jobs is low, or the unit cost of education
is high, optimal for others too. Finally, the last part shows that, if A and  are large enough
or p is small enough, net earnings of those with wealth above a certain level are maximized at
sl 2 (sl(f); sl(f)); implying that the dual education is optimal for them.
4.3 Policy and other implications
What are implications of the above results? This section mainly discusses policy and other impli-
cations on the choice of languages of education in a multilingual country.
As mentioned in Introduction, a general consensus among specialists on language and education
is that using a local ethnic language at least in primary education is e¤ective for students to acquire
adequate skills (Heugh, 2011b). Consistent with this consensus, Proposition 1 implies that balanced
education of skills to operate a common language and skills to operate a local language (moderate
sl) is critical for skill development of those who choose a local job due to limited wealth (a < e+).
The results in the previous sections, however, show that the advantage of the balanced dual
education in skill development does not necessarily translate into higher economic returns of the
education. Earnings net of educational spending of individuals with little wealth decrease with
sl and common-language-only education brings the highest return to them.39 Further, when a
37Like Proposition 4 in Section 3 and Proposition A1 in Appendix A, on which this result is based, analytical
results cannot be obtained for some ranges of sl. Similar to (i), net earnings increase or decrease discontinuously at
sl = sl(f) and sl = sl(f). See Lemma A4 in the proof of the proposition for details on directions of change.
38Net earnings change discontinuously when the return turns from negative to positive or the other way around,
because Hn
Hl
(the ratio of human capital of workers with a national job to workers with a local job) changes dis-
continuously with the discontinuous change in educational investment by the poor. When e+ = e (Proposition 5);
by contrast, net earnings change continuously, because a discontinuous change in n (the proportion of individuals
choosing a national job among those with wealth a  e+ = e) makes Hn
Hl
change continuously.
39To be precise, when e+ < e, their net earnings decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f). The net earnings, however,
are always maximized at sl = 0:
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country has unfavorable conditions, i.e. the level of TFP is low, the e¤ectiveness of common
language education (relative to ethnic language education) in skill development is low, or the unit
cost of education is high, net earnings of all individuals decrease with sl and such education is
best for all in terms of the economic outcome.40 This implies that there exists a trade-o¤ between
educational and economic outcomes for those with little wealth, and when the conditions are not
good, the trade-o¤exists for everyone choosing a local job: under common-language-only education,
their net earnings are highest but their academic performance is poorest.
The results also imply that improved academic performance of students after the expansion of
local language education is not necessarily a proof that the greater emphasis on the education is
desirable. When the initial situation is such that the return to educational investment for local
jobs is negative because of very low sl, the government can change the return to positive by raising
sl appropriately, and can boost educational expenditure (from 0 to a) of those who have limited
wealth and end up in a local job (Figure 3). The policy change succeeds in raising their skill.
However, it always lowers net earnings of the very poor (their gross earnings could increase), and
when the countrys conditions are not good, net earnings of others too.
Further, Proposition 2 implies that introducing local language education on a small scale (sl<sl
or sl(f)) is denitely worse than common-language-only education: the introduction does not
improve academic performance of students from poor families and lowers net earnings of all.
What kind of policies should the government implement in order to bring good educational
and economic outcomes to everyone? The answer depends on conditions of a country. When it
has favorable conditions (TFP is reasonably high, and education, in particular, common language
education, is reasonably e¤ective), the government should implement the dual education of an
appropriate balance together with redistributive policies enabling those with little wealth expend
(su¢ ciently) more on education, such as income transfers, tuition subsidy, and education loans.41
Without the latter policies, the very poor lose economically from the implementation of the dual
education, because they cannot spend su¢ ciently enough on education to benet from it.
When the conditions are not good, net earnings of all individuals are highest but academic
performance of students from families with limited wealth are lowest under common-language-only
education.42 The dual education of an appropriate weight on local language contents, by contrast,
attains the higher academic performance of these students, but at the cost of net earnings of
all. The dual education lowers the human capital of workers in national jobs and this has a
negative e¤ect on earnings of workers in complementary local jobs as well as on earnings of workers
40To be precise, when e+ < e, net earnings decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f), sl = sl(f), or both.
41Of course, given weights on the two types of education (given sl), redistributive policies toward those without
abundant wealth (a < e) are desirable (if the return to education is positive for all jobs or if the policies lift post-
transfer wealth of all individuals above e), because the policies raise their educational spending and net earnings
in the credit constrained economy. Rather, what the statement in the main text asserts is that redistribution of a
su¢ cient scale toward the very poor is needed to implement the dual education (to choose intermediate sl).
42Proposition 1 shows that they do not spend on education because the return to education is negative for local
jobs. As mentioned earlier, in the real economy, a great majority of them take some education, most likely because of
motives other than the investment motive, which the model abstracts from, but the result shows that their investment
motive is very weak, which is consistent with their poor academic performance in the real economy.
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in national jobs. The redistributive policies cannot change the lower economic return of the dual
education (Corollary 1). On top of the dual education with the redistribution, what the government
should conduct is policies raising TFP and the e¤ectiveness of education, in particular, of common
language education. If these policies are conducted on a su¢ cient scale, the positive e¤ect of the
dual education on earnings through the increased human capital of workers in local jobs outweighs
the negative e¤ect through the decreased human capital of workers in national jobs, and net
earnings of everyone become higher under the education. The government, however, may not be
able to implement these policies on a su¢ cient scale for budgetary or other reasons. If this is
the case, the dual education with a smaller weight on ethnic language contents than under the
ideal case, e.g. sl slightly greater than sl when e+ = e, might be acceptable: it achieves the better
academic performance of students from poor families than common-language-only education at the
relatively small cost of net earnings.
To summarize, although the balanced dual education is essential in raising the educational
outcome of students from modest backgrounds, in order to raise their net earnings as well as those
of others, other policies must be implemented together, and what kind of complementary policies
should be conducted depend on the productivity level of the economy and the cost e¤ectiveness of
education, in particular, of common language education.
These implications apply to the issue of "practical" vocational contents versus "non-practical"
academic contents in basic education of low-income countries as well, if local (common) language
education in the above discussions is replaced with vocational (academic) education. The dual
education of academic and vocational contents of an appropriate balance brings the higher aca-
demic achievement of students from humble backgrounds than academic-only education, but net
earnings of all individuals become higher under such education only if complementary policies
are implemented together. If the countrys conditions are good, the redistributive policies should
be conducted, otherwise, policies raising TFP or the e¤ectiveness of education, in particular, of
academic education should be conducted together with the redistribution.
Finally, the result that the redistributive policies are essential for the very poor to benet
economically from the dual education gives another justication for governmental support of basic
education, in addition to usual rationales based on positive externality, human rights, and among
others, in multilingual countries and in low-income countries with large traditional sectors.
5 Conclusion
Many developing countries are populated by multiple ethnic groups who use their own language
in daily life and in local business, but have to use a common language in national business and
in communications with other groups. In these countries, how much weights should be placed on
teaching a local ethnic language and teaching a common language and which language should be
used as a language of instruction of other subjects are critical issues. A similar conict arises in
low-income countries in general between teaching skills that are "practical" and directly useful in
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local jobs, and teaching academic skills that are important in modern sector jobs.
A general consensus among specialists on language and education is that using a local ethnic
language as a language of teaching and learning at least in primary education is e¤ective for students
to acquire adequate skills. By contrast, we know very little what is a desirable combination of
ethnic language education and common language education in terms of earnings and what kind
of educational and economic policies should be conducted when both educational and economic
outcomes of students are taken into account. There also seems to be little agreement on desirable
weights on "practical" vocational contents and academic contents in basic education.
This paper has developed a simple model to examine these questions. It is shown that balanced
education of the two languages/skills is critical for skill development of students with limited wealth
for educational investment. It is also found that the balanced education brings higher earnings net
of educational expenditure, only when a country has favorable conditions, i.e. productivity is rea-
sonably high, and education, in particular, common language (academic) education, is reasonably
e¤ective, and only for those with su¢ cient wealth. Common-language-only (academic-only) edu-
cation maximizes net earnings of those with little wealth, and, when the countrys conditions are
not good, maximizes net earnings of all. This implies that there always exists a trade-o¤ between
educational and economic outcomes for those with little wealth, and such trade-o¤ also exists for
others choosing a local job, when the conditions are not good.
Several policy implications can be derived from these results. When the countrys conditions
are favorable, in order to bring good educational and economic outcomes to all, the government
should implement the dual education of an appropriate balance together with redistributive policies
enabling those with limited wealth expend more on education. By contrast, when the conditions are
not good, it should implement not only the dual education with the redistribution but also policies
raising the productivity level of the economy, and the e¤ectiveness of education, in particular, of
common language (academic) education.
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Appendix A: Proposition A1 and Claim 1
This Appendix presents detailed results on e¤ects of sl on earnings when the return to educational
investment for local jobs is positive and e+ < e: Proposition 4 in Section 3 provides summarized
results. The appendix also presents Claim 1 that is used for drawing Figure 3 in Section 2. Proofs
of the proposition and the claim are contained in Appendix C posted on the authors webpage.43
Proposition A1 Suppose that the return to educational investment for local jobs is positive and
e+ < e holds.
43The address is http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~yuki/english.html.
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(i) (a) If e+(0)  phl1  ; which is the case in which the proportion of individuals with limited wealth
is high, d(wnhn)dsl < 0 for any sl:
(b) Otherwise, d(wnhn)dsl < 0 for sl  s
]
l , where s
]
l 2 (0; s??l ) satises s]l = (1 )  phle+(s]l ) ; and when
E(eje< e+(0))
R e+(0)
0 ef(e)de
F (e+(0))
> max
n
phl
1  ;
e+(0)
1+
o
, d(wnhn)dsl > 0 for sl  s[l ; where s[l 2 (0; s
]
l)
satises s[l = (1  )   phlE(eje<e+(s[l )) :
44
(ii) (a) If e 1+1 phl; d(wlhl)dsl >0 for sls
4
l;h(e)2(s?l (e); s5l;h(e)) when e>max f(phl+e+(0)) ;(e)g ;
d(wlhl)
dsl
< 0 for sl s5l;h(e) when e>max f[phl+E(eje<e+(0))] ;
(e)g, and d(wlhl)dsl < 0 for any
sl when e  [phl+E(eje<e+(0))] ; where s4l;h(e) is the greater solution of L(sl) ee+(sl)s2l+
[(1 )e+(sl) (1+)phl]esl+[  (phl+e+(sl))+e]phl = 0 and (e)  (phl+e)1+ 1
4phle
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
,
while s5l;h(e) is the greater solution of M(sl)= 0; where M(sl) equals L(sl) with e
+(sl) replaced
with E(eje<e+(sl)), and 
(e) equals (e) with e replaced with E(eje < e):
(b) Otherwise, d(wlhl)dsl is positive for sl2
h
maxf0; s4l;l(e)g; s4l;h(e)
i
when e>max f(phl+e+(0));(e)g
(s4l;l(e) < 0 when e (phl+e)), negative for sl maxf0; s5l;l(e)g (s4l;l(e) 2 (s5l;l(e); sl (e))) and
sl s5l;h(e) when emax f[phl+E(eje<e+(0))];
(e)g (s5l;l(e) < 0 when e[phl+E(eje<e)]
and when E(eje < e)  1+1 phl); and negative for any sl when E(eje < e+(0))  1+1 phl and
e[phl+E(eje<e+(0))] or when e
(e+(0)), where s4l;l(e) (s5l;l(e)) is the lower solution of
L(sl)=0 (M(sl)=0):
Claim 1 Suppose
R e
0 ef(e)de 2 (0; (1 )e]. As illustrated in Figure 3, on the (sl; F (e)) plane, the
dividing line between e+ < e and e+ = e when the return to educational investment for local jobs
is positive is located below the dividing line when the return is negative on the loci for zero return.
Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions (Possibly not for
publication)
Proof of Proposition 1. (i)(a) Suppose that education is worthwhile for local jobs. Consider
case e+ < e rst. From (2), (3), (4), and (10), the marginal return to educational investment for
local jobs when e+ < e equals
wl
sl
p
  1 = (1 )A
h
hn(e+;sl)
(1 )hl(e+;sl)
i
sl
p   1 = (1 )A
24  (1 sl)e+p
(1 )

hl+
sle
+
p

35 sl
p  1: (14)
In the above equation,
44They are su¢ cient but not necessary conditions. d(wnhn)
dsl
< (>)0 could hold for sl smaller than s
]
l (greater than
s[l ) . Similar statements apply to (ii) as well.
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where the numerator equals, from (37) in the proof of Lemma 1 below,
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The sign of the derivative of wl
sl
p   1 with respect to sl is same as the sign of the following
derivative, which, by using the above equations, can be expressed as
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The following lemma presents the critical result on (18).
Lemma A1 There exists an sl 2 (1 ; 11+) such that (18) equals zero and the equation is positive
(negative) for lower (higher) sl:
Proof of Lemma A1. Clearly, (18) is positive for sl  1    and negative for sl  11+ . (18)
is positive for sl greater than 1   and weakly lower than the unique sl 2 (1  ; 11+) satisfying
(1 sl sl)hl+(1 sl )sl e
+
p = 0 too, because, for such sl; (1 sl sl)hl+(1 sl )sl e
+
p  0
and (1 sl sl)hlF (e+)+(1  sl   ) slp
R e+
0 ef(e)de    (1  sl   ) slp
h
e+F (e+)  R e+0 ef(e)dei > 0;
where the former statement is true from
d

(1 sl sl)hl+(1 sl )sl e
+
p

dsl
=  (1+)hl+(1 2sl ) e
+
p +(1 sl ) slp
de+
dsl
<  (1+)hl+(1 2sl ) e
+
p < 0 for sl>1  (since de
+
dsl
> 0): (19)
Thus, the lemma is proved if the derivative of the expression inside the curly bracket of (18)
with respect to sl is negative for sl greater than the critical value and lower than 11+ ; which equals
hl
d

(1 sl sl)hlF (e+)+(1 sl )
sl
p
R e+
0 ef(e)de

dsl
+ 1
d

(1 sl sl)hl+(1 sl )sl e
+
p

dsl
hl(e
+; sl)e
+f(e+)
+ 1
h
(1 sl sl)hl+(1 sl )sl e
+
p
i
d[hl(e+;sl)e+f(e+)]
dsl
; (20)
where
d

(1 sl sl)hlF (e+)+(1 sl )
sl
p
R e+
0 ef(e)de

dsl
=  (1+)hlF (e+)+(1 2sl )1p
R e+
0 ef(e)de+
h
(1 sl sl)hl+(1 sl )sl e
+
p
i
f(e+)
de+
dsl
<  (1+)hlF (e+)+(1 2sl )1p
R e+
0 ef(e)de < 0 for sl greater than the critical value; (21)
where the rst inequality sign is from (19).
Hence, the derivative of (18) is negative if the last term of (20) is negative, which holds unless
f 0(e+) is negative and jf 0(e+)j is very large, since (1 sl sl)hl+(1 sl )sl e
+
p < 0 for such sl.
From the lemma, there exists an sl 2 (1 ; 11+) such that the derivative of the marginal return
wl
sl
p   1 with respect to sl equals zero, and the marginal return increases (decreases) with sl for sl
smaller (greater) than the critical value. Because the marginal return equals  1 at sl = 0; 1 from
(14); if A is high enough that wl
sl
p   1 > 0 holds at sl such that (18) equals zero, there exist two
critical values of sl satisfying wl
sl
p   1 = 0 and the marginal return is negative for sl smaller than
the lower critical value and greater than the higher one and positive for sl between them.
When e+ = e; from (7), (6), and (8),
29
Hl(e;n;sl)=(1 )
n
[1 F (e)]hl(e;sl)+
R e
0hl(e;sl)f(e)de
o
;Hn(e;n;sl)=
n
[1 F (e)]hl(e;sl)+
R e
0hl(e;sl)f(e)de
o
hn(e;sl)
hl(e;sl)
:
(22)
Thus, from (2) (4), the marginal return when e+ = e equals
wl
sl
p
  1 = (1 )A
h
hn(e;sl)
(1 )hl(e;sl)
i
sl
p   1 = (1 )A
24 (1 sl)ep (sl) 1
(1 )

hl+
sle
p

35 1
p 1: (23)
In the above equation,
d
 
(1 sl)e
p
hl+
sle
p
(sl)
1

!
dsl
=
d
 
(1 sl)e
p
hl+
sle
p
!
dsl
(sl)
1
+
(1 sl)e
p
hl+
sle
p
(sl)
1

sl
=
(sl)
1

e
p
hl+
sle
p
 

hl+
e
p

+

hl+
sle
p

1 sl
sl
hl+
sle
p
=
(sl)
1

e
p
1
sl
hl+
sle
p
(1 sl sl)hl+ epsl(1 sl )
hl+
sle
p
; (24)
which is positive (negative) for sl smaller (greater) than the critical value satisfying (1 sl sl)hl+
e
psl(1 sl ) = 0: Hence, the statement is true as in the case of e+ < e.
(b) The result when e+ = e is straightforward from (23).
When e+ < e, the marginal return depends on e+ from (14), thus how these exogenous variables
a¤ect the return through e+ must be examined. From (10), (5), (3), and (4), e+ is a solution to

R e+
0

hl+
sle
p

f(e)dee+ = (1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)] e
i
hl+
sle
+
p

: (25)
Thus, e+ does not depend on A and  and the result on these variables is straightforward from
(14). e+ depends negatively on p from (35) in the proof of Lemma 1 and the derivative of the
RHS   LHS of the above equation with respect to p, which equals

R e+
0
sle
p2
f(e)dee+ (1 )
nR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)] e
o
sle
+
p2
= sle
+
p2
(R e+
0 ef(e)de 
R e+
0

hl+
sle
p

f(e)dee+
hl+
sle
+
p
)
< 0:
(26)
The result on p is clear from (14) and de
+
dp < 0: The result on F (e) is from (14) and e
+ being
decreasing in F (e), which is from the fact that the RHS   LHS of (25) decreases with F (e).
(ii) When the return to educational investment for local jobs is positive, e+ = e holds i¤ (8)
satises n  1; i.e.,

R e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de  (1  )[1  F (e)]hl(e; sl)
, R e0 hl + slp e f(e)de  (1  )[1  F (e)]hl + slp e
, hlF (e) + slp
h

R e
0 ef(e)de+ (1  )eF (e)
i
 (1  )

hl +
sl
p e

, F (e) 
(1  )

hl +
sl
p e

  slp 
R e
0 ef(e)de
hl +
sl
p (1  )e
= 1  
hl +
sl
p
R e
0 ef(e)de
hl +
sl
p (1  )e
: (27)
30
When
R e
0 ef(e)de > (1 )e; which implies F (e) > 1 ; e+ = e cannot hold, because the RHS
of (27) decreases with sl and is smaller than 1  . When
R e
0 ef(e)de  (1  )e, the RHS weakly
increases with sl, hence e+ = e could hold and e+ = e always when F (e)  1  . The rest of the
statement is straightforward from (27) (note that F (e) raises
R e
0 ef(e)de and thus lowers the RHS).
When the return is negative, from (13), (4), and (12), wnhn(e; sl)  e = wlhl can be expressed
as

A
fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl
n[1 F (e)]hn(e;sl)
1 
 (1 sl)p  1

e=(1 )A

n[1 F (e)]hn(e;sl)
fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl

hl: (28)
n 2 (0; 1] satisfying the above equation exists, that is, e+ = e holds i¤ the LHS of the above
equation is weakly smaller than the RHS at n = 1 :
A

F (e)hl
[1 F (e)]hn(e;sl)
1 
 (1 sl)p  1

e(1 )A

[1 F (e)]hn(e;sl)
F (e)hl

hl
,

A

F (e)hl
[1 F (e)]e
1   1 slp  e(1 )A[1 F (e)]eF (e)hl hl
,

 1 slp
 A[1 F (e)]eF (e)hl  hl[1 F (e)]e [F (e) (1 )]
, F (e) (1 )
[F (e)][1 F (e)]1 A

 1 slp
hl
e
1 1: (29)
Clearly, the condition is satised when sl is high and when F (e)1 . It holds when F (e) is
low because the derivative of the rst part of the LHS of (29) with respect to F (e) equals
[F (e)][1 F (e)]1 f(e)
n
1 [F (e) (1 )]


F (e)
  1 
1 F (e)
o
f[F (e)][1 F (e)]1 g2 =
[F (e)][1 F (e)]1 f(e)
n
1  [F (e) (1 )][ F (e)]
F (e)[1 F (e)]
o
f[F (e)][1 F (e)]1 g2
= [F (e)]
[1 F (e)]1 f(e)(1 )
f[F (e)][1 F (e)]1 g3 > 0: (30)
Proof of Lemma 1. [When the return to educational investment for local jobs is
positive] When e+ < e; by totally di¤erentiating (10), one obtains
Hl(e
+; sl)
@hn(e+;sl)
@e+
 (1 )Hn(e+; sl)@hl(e
+;sl)
@e+
+
@Hl(e
+; sl)
@e+
hn(e
+; sl) (1 )@Hn(e
+; sl)
@e+
hl(e
+; sl)

de+
+

Hl(e
+; sl)
@hn(e+;sl)
@sl
 (1 )Hn(e+; sl)@hl(e
+;sl)
@sl
+
@Hl(e
+; sl)
@sl
hn(e
+; sl) (1 )@Hn(e
+; sl)
@sl
hl(e
+; sl)

dsl = 0;
(31)
where
@Hl(e
+; sl)
@e+
= hl(e
+; sl)f(e
+) > 0;
@Hn(e
+; sl)
@e+
=  hn(e+; sl)f(e+) < 0: (32)
@Hl(e
+; sl)
@sl
=
R e+
0
@hl(e;sl)
@sl
f(e)de = 1p
R e+
0 ef(e)de > 0: (33)
@Hn(e
+; sl)
@sl
=
R e
e+
@hn(e;sl)
@sl
f(e)de+ [1  F (e)]@hn(e;sl)@sl =  

p
nR e
e+ef(e)de+ [1  F (e)]e
o
< 0:
(34)
31
In (31), the term of de+ equals
Hl(e
+; sl)
@hn(e+;sl)
@e+
  (1  )Hn(e+; sl)@hl(e
+;sl)
@e+
+ hn(e
+; sl)hl(e
+; sl)f(e
+)
= 1
e+

Hl(e
+; sl)hn(e
+; sl)  (1  )Hn(e+; sl)

hl(e
+; sl)  hl
	
+ hn(e
+; sl)hl(e
+; sl)f(e
+)
= 1
e+
(1  )Hn(e+; sl)hl + hn(e+; sl)hl(e+; sl)f(e+) (from (10))
=  1 slp
n
(1  ) hl
e+
hR e
e+ef(e)de+ [1  F (e)]e
i
+ e+hl(e
+; sl)f(e
+)
o
> 0; (35)
The terms of dsl equals
Hl(e
+; sl)
@hn(e+;sl)
@sl
  (1  )Hn(e+; sl)@hl(e
+;sl)
@sl
+hn(e
+; sl)
R e+
0
@hl(e;sl)
@sl
f(e)de  (1  )
hR e
e+
@hn(e;sl)
@sl
f(e)de+ [1  F (e)]@hn(e;sl)@sl
i
hl(e
+; sl)
= 1p
n
 e+HT (e+; sl)+(1 )Hn(e+; sl)+hs(e+; sl)R e+0 ef(e)de+(1 )hR ee+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]eihl(e+; sl)o
=
1
p
8<:  
e+(1 )Hn(e+;sl)
hn(e+;sl)
[hl(e
+; sl)+hn(e
+; sl)]
+hs(e
+; sl)
R e+
0 ef(e)de+(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
hl(e
+; sl)
9=; (from (10))
=
1
p
8<:  (1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
[hl(e
+; sl)+hn(e
+; sl)]
+hs(e
+; sl)
R e+
0 ef(e)de+(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
hl(e
+; sl)
9=; (from (5) and (4))
=  hn(e+;sl)p
n
(1  )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+ [1  F (e)]e
i
  R e+0 ef(e)deo < 0; (36)
where the last inequality holds because

h
hl
R e+
0 f(e)de+
sl
p
R e+
0 ef(e)de
i
e+ = (1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
hl + sl
e+
p

,
n
F (e+)e+ (1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
io
hl=sl
e+
p
n
(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
 R e+0 ef(e)deo from (10)
and thus sign
n
(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
 R e+0 ef(e)deo=signnF (e+)e+ (1 )hR ee+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]eio .
Hence,
de+
dsl
=
hn(e+;sl)
p
n
(1  )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+ [1  F (e)]e
i
  R e+0 ef(e)deo
1
e+
(1  )Hn(e+; sl)hl + hn(e+; sl)hl(e+; sl)f(e+)
=
e+
p
n
(1  )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+ [1  F (e)]e
i
  R e+0 ef(e)deo
(1  ) hl
e+
hR e
e+ef(e)de+ [1  F (e)]e
i
+ hl(e+; sl)e+f(e+)
> 0: (37)
When e+ = e; from (8),
dn
dsl
= 
hl(e; sl)
R e
0
@hl(e;sl)
@sl
f(e)de  @hl(e;sl)@sl
R e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de
[1  F (e)] [hl(e; sl)]2
= 
hl
p
R e
0 ef(e)de  e
R e
0 f(e)de

[1  F (e)] [hl(e; sl)]2
< 0:
(38)
[When the return is negative] First consider case e+ < e. From (13), (4), and (11),
wnhn(e
+; sl) e+ = wlhl can be expressed as
32
24A
0@ F (e+)hlR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e


(1 sl)
p
1A1  1 slp  1
35e+=(1 )A
0@R ee+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e 1 slp
F (e+)hl
1Ahl
,
24A F (e+)hlR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
!1 
 

 1 slp
 35e+=(1 )A R ee+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
F (e+)hl
!
hl (39)
Since the LHS increases with e+, the RHS decreases with e+; and the LHS decreases with sl;
e+ satisfying the above equation increases with sl.
When e+ = e; from (13), (4), and (12), wnhn(e; sl)  e = wlhl can be expressed as
A
fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl
n[1 F (e)]e
1 
 1 slp  1

e=(1 )A

n[1 F (e)]e
fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl

hl
,

A
fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl
n[1 F (e)]e
1   1 slp  e =(1 )A n[1 F (e)]efF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghlhl: (40)
Since the LHS decreases with n, the RHS increases with n; and the LHS decreases with sl;
n satisfying the above equation decreases with sl.
Proof of Lemma 2. [When the return to educational investment for local jobs is
positive] When e+ < e; from (2) and (32) in the proof of Lemma 1,
@wn
@e+
= (1  )wn

1
Hl(e+;sl)
@Hl(e
+; sl)
@e+
  1
Hn(e+;sl)
@Hn(e
+; sl)
@e+

= (1  )wnf(e+)
h
hl(e
+;sl)
Hl(e+;sl)
+ hn(e
+;sl)
Hn(e+;sl)
i
= wnf(e
+) hn(e
+;sl)
Hn(e+;sl)
(from (10))
= wne
+R e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
f(e+) > 0: (41)
From (2), (33); and (34) in the proof of Lemma 1,
@wn
@sl
= (1  )wn

1
Hl(e+;sl)
@Hl(e
+; sl)
@sl
  1
Hn(e+;sl)
@Hn(e
+; sl)
@sl

= (1  )wnp
n
1
Hl(e+;sl)
R e+
0 ef(e)de+

Hn(e+;sl)
hR e
e+ef(e)de+ [1  F (e)]e
io
= (1  )wnp
" R e+
0 ef(e)de
hl
R e+
0 f(e)de+
sl
p
R e+
0 ef(e)de
+ p1 sl
#
= (1  )wnp
phl
R e+
0 f(e)de+
R e+
0 ef(e)de
(1 sl)

hl
R e+
0 f(e)de+
sl
p
R e+
0 ef(e)de

= wne
+R e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
1
p


phl
R e+
0 f(e)de+
R e+
0 ef(e)de

(1 sl)hl(e+;sl) > 0; (42)
where the last equality is because 
h
hl
R e+
0 f(e)de+
sl
p
R e+
0 ef(e)de
i
e+=(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
hl(e
+; sl)
from (10):
33
From (41), (42), and (37) in the proof of Lemma 1,
dwn
dsl
=
@wn
@sl
+
@wn
@e+
de+
dsl
= wne
+R e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
1
p
0@
h
phlF (e
+)+
R e+
0 ef(e)de
i
(1 sl)hl(e+; sl) +
f(e+)e+
n
(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
 R e+0 ef(e)deo
(1 ) hl
e+
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
+hl(e+; sl)e+f(e+)
1A
= wne
+R e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
1
p
0@hphlF (e+)+R e+0 ef(e)dein(1 ) hle+ hR ee+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]ei+hl(e+; sl)e+f(e+)o
+(1 sl)hl(e+; sl)f(e+)e+
n
(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
 R e+0 ef(e)deo
1A
(1 sl)hl(e+; sl)
n
(1 ) hl
e+
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
+hl(e+; sl)e+f(e+)
o
= wne
+R e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
1
p
0@ hphlF (e+)+R e+0 ef(e)dei(1 ) hle+ hR ee+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]ei
+hl(e
+; sl)e
+f(e+)
n
(1 sl)(1 )
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
+p
h
hlF (e
+)+ slp
R e+
0 ef(e)de
io1A
(1 sl)hl(e+; sl)
n
(1 ) hl
e+
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
+hl(e+; sl)e+f(e+)
o
= wn
hl(e+;sl)
e+
p
1
1 sl
(1 )
n

hl
e+
h
phlF (e
+)+
R e+
0 ef(e)de
i
+
  p
e+
hl+1

hl(e
+; sl)e
+f(e+)
o
(1 ) hl
e+
hR e
e+ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
i
+hl(e+; sl)e+f(e+)
> 0; (43)
where the last equality is again from (10):
When e+ = e; from (6), (7), and (8),
Hl(n; sl) =
R e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de+
 
1 
(
1 +
R e
0 hl(e;sl)f(e)de
[1 F (e)]hl(e;sl)
)!
[1  F (e)]hl(e; sl)
= (1  )
nR e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de+ [1  F (e)]hl(e; sl)
o
; (44)
Hn(n; sl) = 
hn(e;sl)
hl(e;sl)
nR e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de+ [1  F (e)]hl(e; sl)
o
: (45)
By substituting the above equations into (2),
wn = A

1 

hl(e;sl)
hn(e;sl)
1 
: (46)
Thus,
dwn
dsl
= (1  )wn

1
hl(e;sl)
e
p +
1
hn(e;sl)
 ep

= (1  )wn 11 sl
hl(e;sl)+
1

hn(e;sl)
hl(e;sl)
> 0: (47)
Since wl = (1  )A

Hn
Hl

= (1  )A

A
wn
 
1 
from (2), dwldsl =  

1 
wl
wn
dwn
dsl
< 0:
[When the return is negative] Straightforward from Lemma 1 and the rst equation of (39)
when e+ < e and of (40) when e+ = e.
Proof of Proposition 2. When e+ < e, wlhl = wnhn(e
+; sl) e+ = [wnhn(1; sl) 1] e+ decreases
with sl from Lemma 2. Then, wnhn(e; sl) e = [wnhn(1; sl) 1] e for e > e+ too decreases with sl,
34
because wnhn(1; sl) 1 decreases with sl from the above equation and de+dsl > 0 (Lemma 1). When
e+ = e; wlhl = wnhn(e; sl)  e decreases with sl from Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) From (47) in the proof of Lemma 2,
d[wnhn(e; sl)]
dsl
=
dwn
dsl
hn(e; sl) + wn
dhn(e; sl)
dsl
= wnhn(e;sl)1 sl
h
(1  )hl(e;sl)+
1

hn(e;sl)
hl(e;sl)
  1
i
= wnhn(e;sl)1 sl
(1 ) 1

hn(e;sl) hl(e;sl)
hl(e;sl)
: (48)
Thus,
d(wnhn)
dsl
R 0, (1  ) (1 sl)ep   

hl +
sle
p

R 0
, sl S (1  )  phl
e
: (49)
(ii) From (47) in the proof of Lemma 2 and (2),
d[wlhl(e; sl)]
dsl
=
dwl
dsl
hl(e; sl) + wl
dhl(e; sl)
dsl
=   1  wlwn dwndsl hl(e; sl) + wl
dhl(e;sl)
dsl
= wl1 sl
1
hl(e;sl)
n
  hl(e; sl) + 1hn(e; sl)hl(e; sl) + ep(1  sl)hl(e; sl)o : (50)
Thus,
d(wlhl)
dsl
R 0,  

hl +
e
p

hl +
sle
p

+ ep(1  sl)

hl +
sle
p

R 0
, p2  ee(sl)2 + [(1  )e  (1 + )phl] esl + [  (phl + e) + e] phl	 R 0: (51)
(a) Suppose that the LHS of (51) is positive at sl = 0, i.e. e >  (phl+e) : Because the derivative
of the LHS at sl = 0 is non-positive, i.e. (1   )e   (1 + )phl  0 and the LHS at sl = 1 equals
 ee+[(1  )e  (1 + )phl] e+[  (phl + e) + e] phl =   (phl + e)(phl + e) < 0, there exists an
s?l (e) 2 (0; 1) such that d(wlhl)dsl R 0, sl S s?l (e); where s?0l (e) > 0; since, from (51),
s?l (e) =
[(1 )e  (1+)hl] e+
q
[(1 )e  (1+)phl]2e2+ 4ee [ (phl+e)+ e] phl
2ee
=
[(1 )e  (1+)hl]+
q
[(1 )e  (1+)phl]2+ 4e [  (phl+e) e 1+ 1] phl
2e
: (52)
s?l (e) < s
??
l for e < e; since wlhl(e; sl) = wnhn(e; sl) (thus s
?
l (e) = s
??
l ) and s
?0
l (e) > 0:
Suppose instead that the LHS of (51) is non-positive at sl = 0, i.e. e   (phl+e) : Because
the derivative of the LHS at sl = 0 is non-positive and the LHS at sl = 1 is negative,
d(wlhl)
dsl
< 0
for any sl > 0 (and
d(wlhl)
dsl
< (=)0 at sl = 0 when e < (=) (phl+e)):
(b) The case in which the LHS of (51) at sl = 0 is positive, i.e. e >  (phl+e) ; can be proven
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as in (a). Suppose that the LHS at sl = 0 is zero, i.e. e =  (phl+e) : Since the derivative of the
LHS at sl = 0 is positive, i.e. (1   ) ep   (1 + )hl > 0, there exists an s?l (e) in (0; 1), such that
the LHS of (51) equals 0, and the LHS is zero at sl = 0; positive for sl 2 (0; s?l (e)), and negative
for sl > s?l (e): Thus,
d(wlhl)
dsl
R 0 for positive sl S s?l (e) and
d(wlhl)
dsl
= 0 at sl = 0:
Instead, suppose that the LHS of (51) at sl = 0 is negative, e <  (phl+e) : Since the derivative
of the LHS at sl = 0 is positive, i.e. (1  ) ep   (1 + )hl > 0, the LHS is positive (negative) when
e > (<)
(phl+e)phl
f esl+[(1 )e (1+)phl]gsl+phl ; where
(phl+e)phl
f esl+[(1 )e (1+)phl]gsl+phl <  (phl+e) when sl > 0
and  esl + [(1  )e  (1 + )phl] > 0, sl 2 (0;
h
(1  )  (1 + )phle
i
):
So the LHS of (51) is negative for any e <  (phl+e) when sl  (1  )  (1 + )phle : For sl <
(1 ) (1+)phle ; the LHS of (51) is positive (negative) when e > (<) (phl+e)phlf esl+[(1 )e (1+)phl]gsl+phl ;
where the RHS is lowest when  esl + [(1  )e  (1 + )phl]  esl = 0, sl = (1 )e (1+)phl2e :
Hence, the LHS of (51) is negative, i.e. d(wlhl)dsl < 0, for any sl when
e 
h
(phl+e)phl
f esl+[(1 )e (1+)phl]gsl+phl at sl =
(1 )e (1+)phl
2e
i
=
(phl+e)phl
phl+
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
4e
=
(phl+e)
1+ 1
4phe
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
;
except at sl =
(1 )e (1+)phl
2e and e =
(phl+e)
1+ 1
4phe
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
, in which the derivative is zero.
When e 2

(phl+e)
1+ 1
4phe
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
;  (phl+e)

; there exist sl (e) and s
?
l (e), where 0 < s

l (e) <
s?l (e) < (1 ) (1+)phle < s??l , such that the LHS of (51) equals 0 (sl (e) is the smaller solution),
and the LHS is negative for sl < sl (e); positive for sl 2 (sl (e); s?l (e)), and negative for sl > s?l (e):
s?0l (e) > 0 > s
0
l (e) from (52).
Proof of Proposition 5. e+ = e always holds when F (e)  1    from Proposition 1 (ii). The
following lemma is used in the proof of the proposition.
Lemma A2When e+ = e; net earnings change continuously when the return to educational in-
vestment for local jobs turns from negative to positive with a change in sl.
Proof of Lemma A2. When e+ = e and the return is negative; wnhn(e; sl) e = wlhl(0; sl) ,
A

Hl
Hn
1 
 1 slp  1

e= (1 )A

Hn
Hl

hl, where Hl = fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl and Hn= n[1 
F (e)]hn(e; sl), from (12) and (13). When e+ = e and the return is positive; wnhn(e; sl)   e =
wlhl(e; sl) e,

A

Hl
Hn
1 
 1 slp  1

e=(1 )A

Hn
Hl

hl+
sl
p e

 e; where Hl=
R e
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de+
(1 n)[1  F (e)]hl(e; sl) and Hn = n[1  F (e)]hn(e; sl), from (2), (6), and (7). When the return
is zero, i.e. wl
sl
p   1 = 0; this equation becomes

A

Hl
Hn
1 
 1 slp  1

e=(1 )A

Hn
Hl

hl, the same
equation as the case of the negative return, and net earnings of all workers are the same. Since
Hn
Hl
satisfying this equation is uniquely determined for given sl, the net earnings when the return
is zero are same as the net earnings when the return is negative and sl ! sl; sl:
(i) Earnings decrease with sl when the return to educational investment for local jobs is negative
from Proposition 2, while when the return is positive and e+ = e; earnings of all decrease with
sl for sl > s??l  (1   )   phle from Proposition 3. From Proposition 1 (i)(b), the lower critical
value of sl for the negative return, sl; decreases with A and  and increases with p. Hence, from
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Lemma A2, net earnings of all decrease with sl when A and  are small enough or p is large enough
that sl  s??l = s?l (e+) = s?l (e): Note that s??l is smaller than the higher critical value sl, because
s??l < 1   < sl from Lemma A1 in the proof of Proposition 1.
(ii) (a) When sl < s??l = s
?
l (e
+) = s?l (e); from Propositions 2 and 3 and Lemma A2, net earnings
of workers with a national job decrease with sl for sl < sl, increase with sl for sl 2 (sl; s??l ); and
decrease with sl for sl > s??l :
Their net earnings are maximized at either sl = 0 or sl = s??l : From the proof of Lemma A2,
net earnings of such workers at sl = 0 equal"
A

fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl
n[1 F (e)] p e
1 

p 1
#
e; (53)
where n is a solution to (28) in the proof of Proposition 1.
From (23) in the proof of Proposition 1 and (2), net earnings of such workers at sl = s??l equal8><>:A
24(1 )hl+ s??l ep 

(1 s??l )e
p
351  1 s??lp  1
9>=>;e =

A
h
(1 )2
2
i1 

p

1 +
phl
e

 1

e: (54)
From these equations, the net earnings are maximized at sl = s??l ifh
(1 )2
2
i1 


1 +
phl
e

>

fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl
n[1 F (e)] ep
1 
; (55)
which holds when A and  are large and p is small, since n increases with A and  and decreases
with p, which can be shown from (28),

1 +
phl
e

e
p
1 
decreases with p from  (1   )1p +
1 +
phl
e
 1 hl
e =
 (1 )+phle
p

1+
phl
e
 =  s??l
p

1+
phl
e
 < 0; and the condition does hold when n = 1; i.e.
h
(1 )2
2
i1 


1 +
phl
e

>

F (e)hl
[1 F (e)] e
p
1 
. Since F (e)  1    at sl = 0 from (27) in the proof
of Proposition 1, the last statement is proved if
h
(1 )2
2
i1 


1 +
phl
e

>

(1 )hl
 e
p
1 
, (1 
)1 

1 +

phl
e
 1phl
e

> 1 holds, which is true, because s??l  (1  )  phle > 0, phle <
1 
 and the LHS decreases with
phl
e :

phl
e
 

phl
e
 2
1+

phl
e
 1 =  (1 )

phl
e
 1
phl
e
"
1+

phl
e
 1# < 0 from phle < 1  : (56)
(b) Consider case e  1+1 phl rst. Since s?l (e) increases with e, s?l ((phl+e)) = 0; and
s?l (e) = s
??
l from (52) in the proof of Proposition 3, there exists an e
y 2 ((phl+e) ; e); such that
s?l (e
y) = sl. Then, the relationship between sl and net earnings of workers with a local job and
e > ey is similar to that of workers with a national job: their net earnings decrease with sl for
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sl < sl, increase with sl for sl 2 (sl; s?l (e)); and decrease with sl for sl > s?l (e) from Propositions 2
and 3 and Lemma A2: As for workers with e  ey; net earnings decrease with sl.
Now consider case e > 1+1 phl. If A and  are small enough or p is large enough that
s?l ((phl+e))=1   (1+)phle < sl, the result is same as the corresponding case of e  1+1 phl.
Let (e) (phl+e)
1+ 1
4phe
[(1 )e (1+)phl]2
: If s?l ((phl+e))>sl>s
?
l ((e))=
(1 )  (1+)phl
e
2 , there exists
an ez 2 ((e); (phl+e)) such that s?l (ez) = sl. The results for workers with e > (phl+e) and
workers with e  (e) are same as the corresponding cases (e > ey and e  ey respectively) of
e 1+1 phl. As for workers with e2 ((e); (phl+e)); sl (e)
(1 )  (1+)phl
e
2 = s
?
l ((e))<s
?
l (e
z) = sl
holds for any e from (51) and (52) in the proof of Proposition 3. Hence, the result of workers with
e > ez is similar to that of workers with e > (phl+e), and the result of workers with e  ez is
same as that of workers with e  (e): To summarize, the result is similar to the corresponding
case of e  1+1 phl except that the critical wealth level is ez; not ey.
Finally, if s?l ((e)) > sl, because s

l (e) decreases with e, s
 
l ((phl+e)) = 0; and s
 
l ((e)) =
s?l ((e)) =
(1 )  (1+)phl
e
2 from (51) and (52), there exists an e
> 2 ((e); (phl+e)) such that
s l (e
>) = sl. Hence, as for workers with e 2 ((e); (phl+e)); net earnings of workers with e < e>
decrease with sl for sl < sl (e), increase with sl for sl < (s

l (e); s
?
l (e)); and decrease with sl for
sl > s
?
l (e), while net earnings of workers with e  e> decrease with sl for sl < sl, increase with sl
for sl 2 (sl; s?l (e)); and decrease with sl for greater sl: The results for workers with e > (phl+e)
and for workers with e  (e) are same as the previous case.
To summarize, net earnings of workers with wealth and thus educational spending greater than a
certain level decrease with sl for sl < maxfsl; sl (e)g, increase with sl for sl 2 (maxfsl; sl (e)g; s?l (e)),
and decrease with sl for sl > s?l (e), while net earnings of workers with a = e smaller than the
threshold decrease with sl for any sl:
Thus, net earnings of workers with wealth greater than a threshold are maximized at either
sl = 0 or sl = s?l (e): From (28) in the proof of Proposition 1, net earnings of such workers at sl = 0
is same as net earnings of workers with a national job, which equals (53).
From (23) in the proof of Proposition 1, net earnings of such workers with e at sl = s?l (e) equal
(1 )A
24  (1 s?l (e))ep
(1 )

hl+
s?l (e)e
p

35hl+ s?l (e)ep  e: (57)
Thus, the net earnings are maximized at sl = s?l (e) if
A

 ep

(1 )
h
(1 s?l (e))
1 
i
hl+
s?l (e)e
p
1  fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghln[1 F (e)] 1 + e e > 0; (58)
which holds when A and  are large or p is small, because n increases with A and  and decreases
with p, the derivative of the rst term of the expression inside the large curcly bracket with resepct
to sl is 0 at sl = s?l (e) and negative for sl > s
?
l (e); and thus the expression inside the curly bracket
is positive when A and  are large or p is small from (55):
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(1 )
h
(1 s?l (e))
1 
i
hl+
s?l (e)e
p
1  fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghln[1 F (e)] 1 
> (1 )
h
(1 s??l )
1 
i
hl+
s??l e
p
1  fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghln[1 F (e)] 1  (from Proposition 3 (ii)(a))
= 

e
p
1 (h
(1 )2
2
i1 


1+
phl
e

 

fF (e)+(1 n)[1 F (e)]ghl
n[1 F (e)] ep
1 )
> 0: (59)
(c) From the proof of (b), the threshold wealth when e  1+1 phl is ey 2 ((phl+e) ; e) such
that s?l (e
y) = sl. The threshold when e > 1+1 phl is e
y 2 ((phl+e); e) if s?l ((phl+e)) < sl,
ez2((e); (phl+e) such that s?l (ez) = sl if s?l ((phl+e))>sl>s?l ((e)); and (e) if s?l ((e))>sl.
When e > 1+1 phl; case s
?
l ((phl+e)) < sl is realized when A and  are small and p is large,
and case s?l ((e)) > sl is realized when A and  are large and p is small, because sl decreases with
A and  and increases with p from Proposition 1, and s?l ((phl+e)) = (1   )   (1 + )phle and
s?l ((e)) =
1
2
h
(1  )  (1 + )phle
i
decrease with p: Further, ey and ez decrease with A and  and
increase with p; because s?l (e) decreases with p at e = e
y; ez from Lemma A3 below and increases
with e; and sl decreases with A and  and increases with p. Hence, the threshold of wealth decreases
with A and  (except when the threshold is (phl+e) and (e)) and increases with p:
Lemma A3 @s
?
l (e
y)
@p < 0 and
@s?l (e
z)
@p < 0
Proof of Lemma A3. From (52) in the proof of Proposition 2, the derivative of s?l (e) with respect
to p equals a constant times
 (1+)hl+
1
2
n
 (1+)hl2 [(1 )e (1+)phl]+4e
h
 (phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
hl 4ephl(e) 1 hl
o

n
[(1 )e  (1+)phl]2+4pe
h
 (phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
hl
o 1=2
: (60)
Thus,
@s?l (e)
@p
Q 0,  (1+)hl2 [(1 )e (1+)phl]+4e
h
 (phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
hl 4ephl (e) 1 hl Q 2(1+)hl

n
[(1 )e  (1+)phl]2+4pe
h
 (phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
hl
o1=2
: (61)
The lemma is proved if it is shown that @s
?
l (e)
@p  0 cannot hold at e = ey; ez. From the above
equation, @s
?
l (e)
@p  0 is possible only when the LHS of the equation is positive, which is true only
when (1 )e (1+)phl < 0, e < 1+1 phl or  (phl+e)(e) 1+1 phl (e) 1 > 0, e > (2phl+e) :
When the LHS is positive, the above equation can be expressed as
@s?l (e)
@p
Q 0,
n
 (1+)hl2 [(1 )e (1+)phl]+4e
h
 (phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
hl 4ephl (e) 1 hl
o2
Q [2(1+)hl]2
n
[(1 )e  (1+)phl]2+4pe
h
 (phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
hl
o
,  (1+)[(1 )e (1+)phl]
h
 (2phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
+
h
 (2phl+e)(e) 1+1
i2
e
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Q (1+)2p
h
 (phl+e)(e) 1+1
i
hl
,
h
 (2phl+e)(e) 1+1
ih
  (2phl+e)(e) 1+
i
e  (1+)2p(phl) (e) 1 hl Q 0: (62)
The expression is clearly negative when e  (2phl+e) : Hence, @s
?
l (e)
@p  0 is possible only
when e < 1+1 phl and e < (2phl+e) : In this case, the LHS of (61) is weakly smaller than (1+
)hl2 [(1+)phl (1 )e], while, since ey > (phl+e)(ez does not exist) when e < 1+1 phl; the RHS
of (61) is greater than (1+)hl2 [(1+)phl (1 )e] : Hence, @s
?
l (e
y)
@p < 0 holds in this case. The fact
that ez does not exist when e < 1+1 phl proves that
@s?l (e
z)
@p  0 cannot happen.
Proof of Corollary 1. Since F (e) = 0 < 1   , the proof of Proposition 5 can be applied with
a > e for all individuals. The result is straightforward from the proof, since e = e = e+ and thus
s?l (e) = s
?
l (e) = s
??
l hold for workers choosing a local job, and e > (phl+e) holds by assumption
(see footnote 23).
Proof of Proposition 6. In order to prove the proposition, the following lemma is used.
Lemma A4When e+ < e; net earnings of workers with given wealth and a national job increase
discontinuously and those of workers with a local job decrease discontinuously, when the return to
educational investment for local jobs turns from negative to positive with a change in sl.
Proof of Lemma A4. When e+ < e and the return is negative, wnhn(e+; sl) e+ = wlhl ,
A

Hl
Hn
1 
 1 slp  1

e+ = (1 )A

Hn
Hl

hl, where Hl = F (e
+)hl and Hn =
R e
e+hn(e; sl)f(e)de+
[1  F (e)]hn(e; sl), holds from (11) and (13). When e+ < e and the return is positive; wnhn(e+; sl) 
e+ = wlhl(e
+; sl)   e+ ,

A

Hl
Hn
1 
 1 slp  1

e+ = (1 )A

Hn
Hl

hl+
sl
p e
+

  e+; where Hl =R e+
0 hl(e; sl)f(e)de and Hn=
R e
e+hn(e; sl)f(e)de+[1  F (e)]hn(e; sl), holds from (2) and (5). When
the return is zero, i.e. wl
sl
p  1 = 0; this equation becomes

A

Hl
Hn
1 
 1 slp  1

e+=(1 )A

Hn
Hl

hl,
the same equation as the case of the negative return. Because HnHl under the negative return is
greater than HnHl under the positive return for given e
+ and HnHl decreases with e
+, e+ and HnHl
satisfying the above equation are greater when the return is negative. Hence, net earnings of
workers with a local job are greater and net earnings of workers with given a(> e+) and a national
job are smaller when the return is negative and sl approaches a value at which the return is
zero than when the return is zero. That is, net earnings of workers with a national job increase
discontinuously and those of workers with a local job decrease discontinuously when the return
turns from negative to positive with a change in sl.
(i) Let the lower (higher) sl such that the return to educational investment for local jobs is 0
when e+ < e be sl(f) (sl(f)), whose existence is proved in the proof of Proposition 1. As for workers
who have abundant wealth and thus choose a national job for any sl; i.e. a  minfe+(1); eg, their
net earnings decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f); where the earnings increase discontinuously
from Lemma A4, if e+(0)  phl1  or sl(f)  s]l satisfying s]l = (1   )    phle+(s]l ) from Proposition
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A1 (i). The former condition holds when p is large, because e+(0) does not depend on A, ; and
p from (C3) in the proof of Proposition A1 in Appendix C. The latter condition holds when p is
large or A and  are small, because sl(f) increases with p and decreases with A and  from the
proof of Proposition 1, particularly (14), and s]l decreases with p.
As for workers who have limited wealth and thus choose a local job for any sl; i.e. a = e < e+(0),
their net earnings decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f); where the earnings increase discontinuously
from Lemma A4, when E(eje < e+(0))  1+1 phl and e  (phl+E(eje<e+(0))) ; when E(eje <
e+(0))> 1+1 phl and e
(e+(0)), or when sl(f)  s5l;h(e) for greater e; where s5l;h(e) is the greater
solution of M(sl)= 0 (M(sl) equals L(sl) with e+(sl) replaced with E(eje<e+(0))
R e+(sl)
0 ef(e)de
F (e+(sl))
),
from Proposition A1 (ii). Thus, irrespective of a = e; their net earnings decrease with sl except
at sl = sl(f); if sl(f)  s5l;h(e) is true. The condition holds when A and  are small, because
sl(f) decreases with A and ; while s
5
l;h(e) does not depend on A and  from (C9) in the proof of
Proposition A1 in Appendix C and the denition of s5l;h(e): The condition holds when p is large
enough that sl(f)  1     s5l;h(e) holds, where sl(f)  1    is from sl(f) being increasing
in p; and from (14) and Lemma A1 in the proof of Proposition 1, while 1     s5l;h(e) is from
M(1   ) =  [(phl+E(eje<e+(0))) e]phl  0; which is true for any e and sl when p is large
enough that (phl+E(eje<e+(0))) e+(0)  0:
Finally, as for workers who choose a national (local) job when sl is small (large), their net
earnings decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f), sl = sl(f), or both depending on at which sl the
switch to a local job occurs, where the net earnings increase discontinuously from Lemma A4, if
the above conditions are satised.
Net earnings of workers with a < e+(0) are maximized at sl = 0, because their earnings when
the return is negative decrease with sl from Proposition 2 and thus the earnings when sl ! sl(f)
from above are lower than the earnings at sl = 0.
Net earnings of workers with a  minfe+(1); eg are maximized at either sl = 0 or sl = sl(f);
since the earnings increase discontinuously at sl = sl(f): From the proof of Lemma A4, net earnings
of such workers with educational spending e at sl = 0 equal24A
0@ F (e+(0))hl

p
R e
e+(0)ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e

1A1  
p 1
35e = Ap 1  hle+(0)1  p 1e; (63)
where the equality sign is from (10) and (5).
From (14) in the proof of Proposition 1 and (2), their net earnings at sl = sl(f) equal8<:A
24(1 )hl+ sle+p 

(1 sl)e+
p
351  1 slp  1
9=;e =

A
h
(1 )A slp
i1 

 1 slp  1

e (64)


A
h
(1 )A1 p
i1 

p 1

e: (65)
where the equality sign is from the fact that the return for local jobs is 0 at sl = sl(f):
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From (63) and (65), the net earnings are maximized at sl = 0 if
p

1 

hl
e+(0)
1 
>
h
(1 )A1 p
i1 

; (66)
which holds when A and  are small and p is large, since e+(0) does not depend on A, ; and p.
As for those who choose a national job when sl is small and a local job when sl is large, the
proof for those who choose a local (national) job for any sl applies when the switch to a local job
occurs at sl  sl(f) (sl  sl(f)). When the switch occurs at sl 2 (sl(f); sl(f)); the proof of those
who choose a national job for any sl applies, because earnings when the return is negative decrease
with sl from Proposition 2.
(ii) From the above results, if e < minfe+(0); (phl+E(eje<e+(0)))g when E(eje < e+(0)) 
1+
1 phl or if e<minfe+(0);
(e+(0))g when E(eje<e+(0))> 1+1 phl; workers choose a local job for
any sl; and their net earnings decrease with sl except at sl = sl(f); where the earnings increase
discontinuously. Net earnings of such workers are maximized at sl = 0, because the earnings when
the return is negative decrease with sl from Proposition 2.
(iii) As for workers who have abundant wealth and thus choose a national job for any sl;
i.e. a  minfe+(1); eg, their net earnings decrease with sl for sl < sl(f) and sl > sl(f) from
Proposition 2; increase (decrease) discontinuously at sl = sl(f) (sl = sl(f)) from Lemma A4; and
increase (decrease) with sl for sl 2 (sl(f); s[l ] (sl 2 [s]l ; sl(f))); if e+(0) > phl1  ; E(eje < e+(0)) >
max
n
phl
1  ;
e+(0)
1+
o
; and s[l > sl(f), where s
[
l 2 (0; s]l) satises s[l = (1   )    phlE(eje<e+(s[l )) ; from
Proposition A1 (i). (s[l ; s
]
l < 1   < sl(f) from Proposition A1 (i) and Lemma A1 in the proof of
Proposition 1.) The condition holds when A and  are large or p is small, because e+(0) does not
depend on these parameters, s[l decreases with p (since e
+(sl) decreases with p, as shown above);
and sl(f) increases with p and decreases with A and  from Proposition 1.
Their net earnings are maximized at either sl = 0 or sl satisfying
d(wnhn)
dsl
= 0; where the latter
sl satises sl 2 (s[l ; 1  ) and thus sl < 1   < sl(f) from Proposition A1 (i) and Lemma A1 in
the proof of Proposition 1.
From (63) and (64) above, net earnings of such workers with educational spending e at sl = 0
is smaller than their net earnings at sl = s[l (and thus the earnings at sl satisfying
d(wnhn)
dsl
= 0) if
hl
e+(0)
1 
<
h
1
e+(s[l )

hl +
s[le
+(s[l )
p
i1 
(1 s[l), which holds if
hl
e+(0)
1 
<
h
1
e

hl+
s[le
p
i1 
(1 s[l): (67)
The condition holds when p is small enough, because e+(0) does not depend on A; ; and p; s[l
decreases with p, and the RHS increases with s[l :
1 
hl+
s[le
p
e
p   1 s[l =
(1  s[l )e phl 
hl+
s[le
p
!
p(1 s[l )
= phl
e+(s[l )
E(eje<e+(s[l ))
 1 
hl+
s[le
p
!
p(1 s[l )
> 0: (68)
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As for workers who have limited wealth and thus choose a local job for any sl; i.e. a < e+(0),
their net earnings decrease with sl for sl < sl(f) and sl > sl(f) from Proposition 2; decrease
(increase) discontinuously at sl = sl(f) (sl = sl(f)) from Lemma A4; and increase (decrease) with
sl for sl 2 (sl(f);min(s4l;h(e); sl(f))] (sl 2 [s5l;h(e); sl(f)) when s5l;h(e) < sl(f)); if s4l;h(e) > sl(f) and
e >max f(phl+e+(0)) ;(e)g from Proposition A1 (ii). The condition holds when A and  are
large, because e+(0); (e); and s4l;h(e) do not depend on these parameters, and sl(f) decreases with
A and . The condition holds when p is small, because (e) increases with p, s4l;h(e) > [sl satisfying
sl =
(1 ) (1+) phl
e+(sl)
2 ] > 0 when p is small enough, while sl(f) approaches 0 as p decreases, which
is from sl(f) being decreasing in p; and from (14) and Lemma A1 in the proof of Proposition 1.
Their net earnings are maximized at either sl = 0; or sl 2 (s4l;h(e); sl(f)) such that d(wlhl)dsl = 0.
(The earnings at sl = sl(f) are smaller than the earnings when sl ! sl(f) from above and thus
cannot be maximum.) From the proof of Lemma A4, net earnings of such workers at sl = 0 equal
(1 )A
0@pR ee+(0)ef(e)de+[1 F (e)]e
F (e+(0))hl
1Ahl = (1 )Ap 1  e+(0)hl hl: (69)
From (14) in the proof of Proposition 1, net earnings of such workers with e at sl = s
4
l;h(e) equal
(1 )A
26664 
(1 s4l;h(e))e+(s4l;h(e))
p
(1 )
0@hl+ s4l;h(e)e+(s4l;h(e))p
1A
37775

hl +
s4l;h(e)
p e

  e: The net earnings at sl = s4l;h(e) is greater
than at sl = 0 if
(1 )A


p

1 
8<:
24(1 s4l;h(e))e+(s4l;h(e))
hl+
s4l;h(e)e
+(s4l;h(e))
p
35hl+ s4l;h(e)p e e+(0)hl hl
9=; e > 0; (70)
which is true when A or  is large enough, because the expression inside the curly bracket is
positive from d(wlhl)dsl > 0 for sl  s
4
l;h(e): It is true when p is small enough too, since the expression
is positive for sl  s4l;h(e); and, as shown above, s4l;h(e) does not converge to 0 as p decreases.
Finally, as for workers who choose a national (local) job when sl is small (large); i.e. a 2
[e+(0);minfe+(1); eg), the result is clearly similar to workers who choose a national (local) job for
any sl; when the shift to a local job occurs at sl > sl(f) (sl < sl(f)). When the shift occurs at
sl 2 [sl(f); sl(f)]; their net earnings increase discontinuously at sl = sl(f) and sl = sl(f), and
they are maximized at either sl = 0 or sl 2 (sl(f); sl(f)) satisfying d(wnhn)dsl = 0,
d(wlhl)
dsl
= 0, or
a = e+(sl) (sl at which the switch occurs). (The earnings at sl = sl(f) are smaller than the
earnings when sl ! sl(f) from above and thus cannot be maximum.) From the argument above,
the net earnings are maximized at the latter sl when A and  are large enough or p is small enough.
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